Lingustic equality a study in comparative constitucional law

The principle^* of equality is one of the pillars of most constitutional systems. Its specific value in the case of language has been recognised by aPage 44number of constitutions, especially in the form of a non-discrimination clause singling out language as a specially protected ground (art.3 of the German Basic Law, art.3 of the Italian Constitution, art.5 of the Greek Constitution). Yet, the obvious and superficial meaning of the principle —no differentiations should be made between people on the basis of the language they happen to speak— does not seem to be very useful for the members of a linguistic minority: it constitutes only a kind of generic protection which treats the speakers of a minority language as abstract citizens, without acknowledging their cultural identity. Indeed, the absence of distinctions, the application of one-and-the-same rule to everyone is precisely the favourite instrument of linguistic domination and assimilation: everyone in the same school classes, for everyone the same radio and television programmes, for everyone the same administrative forms, irrespective of their mother tongue.

Yet, I will argue in this article that equality can play an extremely important role in the protection of linguistic diversity, because the principle of equality is much richer than the mere 'schematic equality' outlined above. In fact, the deceptively simple rule of equal treatment has undergone, in legal writing and constitutional case-law, an important complexification and even transformation. The prohibition of unlawful differentiations remains an important aspect of it; but it is also increasingly recognised that 'real' equality, in certain circumstances, allows for differentiations, or even requires some distinctive treatment. Indeed, the definition of equality to which most writers, but also most constitutional courts nowadays adhere is the classical Aristotelian definition of justice: 'treating like things alike and different things differently'. In linguistic as in other matters, the role of the equality principle is therefore ambiguous: sometimes, lingustic differences between persons may not be taken into account, while in other circuinstances, the establishment of a differential treatment, the taking of special measures, is mandatory. Such differential treatment can, in its turn, take two different forms. On the one hand, measures of pluralist equality grant to members of lingustic minorities the SAME advantages which the majority already has on the basis of the generally applicable rules: the right to have their children educated in their language, the right to use their language at court or with the administrate authorities, etc. Measures of affirmative equality on the other hand, give some Additional benefits to members of linguistic minorities, to compensate for their handicap of being a minority.

This complexification of the principle of equality is the inevitable result of its role in legal discourse. Saying 'five is equal to five' has exactly the same meaning as saying «five is identical with five»: the two terms of the comparison have only one characteristic, namely their numerical characteristic, the identity of which makes for the identity of the objects as a whole.

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But this notion of equalityas-identity cannot be transferred from the world of pure mathematics into the more complex world of concrete objects. All existing objects possess many characteristics, some of which they may share with other objects, but never all of them. At the very least, every object has its own, specific position in time and space.¹ Declaring that two objects are equal, therefore, does not constitute a statement of general identity, but one of specifiic identity with regard to one specific point of view, the tertium comparationis or criterion of comparison between both. This can be illustrated by the following example, borrowed from P. Western²

(...) assume two bottles of wine — one a rich red Burgundy, the other a sweet white Sauterne. Each bottle contains one liter of wine weighing twenty-five ounces. Are the two bottles equal or unequal? Obviously, the answer depends upon the standards by which one measures them. Measured by ordinary standards of volume, weight, and grape content, the bottles are identical and, thus, equal, in those respects. Measured by ordinary standards of color, taste and acidity, they are non-identical and, thus, unequal in such respects. To say they are equal or unequal merely spells out the identity or nonidentity that obtains among them by reference to given standards of measure.

What applies to objects also applies, a fortiori, to persons. All persons are alike in some respect (e.g. the fact that they are born and have to die), but no two persons are alike in every respect. What does the legal principle of equality, entrenched in all Constitutions or Bills of Rights, then mean? Does it impose to make abstraction of all differences existing between persons, and to treat them alike in all circumstances? Of course not; it is unanimously accepted that such 'mechanical equality' would lead to absurd results. Every legal system is bound to make some distinctions between rich and poor, old and young, men and women, healthy and ill, vicious and virtuous... The definition of equality to which most writers and, as we will see, many constitutional courts adhere, takes account of this complexity; it is the classical Aristotelian definition in which the principle of equality breaks down into two sub-principles: «treat like cases alike and different cases differently, to the extent of their difference».³

Equality judgments can therefore not be made in the abstract, but become meaningful only by considering a particular situation: one can then decide whether, within this specific context, the similarities between persons outweigh the differences, or vice versa, and whether accordingly they shouldPage 46receive a like treatment, or rather a different treatment; or, as Hart says, «a consideration of the objects which the law in question is admittedly designed to realise may make clear the resemblances and differences which a just law should recognise».⁴ cehether one should make distinctions on the ground of age, of gender or of language becomes more arguable if one considers the specific contexts of, say, the right to vote, military service, access to the civil service, pregnancy leave, etc.

If the Aristotelian definition of justice thus makes equality into a realistic and meaningful concept, it also renders it very complex and pervasive. Equality becomes a fundamental right which outstrips all other rights by its all-encompassing field of application and by its open-ended meaning:

1) Equality is ubiquitous: «any case, any challenge can be put in an equal protection framework by competent counsel»;⁵ if the rule operates a distinction between two classes of persons, it can be criticised on the ground that they should have received a like treatment; if the rule makes no differentiations at all, it can be argued on the contrary that it has failed to recognise differences existing in reality. While other constitutional rights are linked to a relatively well-defined substantive domain; the scope of equality has no such intrinsic limits; it requires a justification why any rule is as it is.

2) Moreover, the meaning of equality is also exceedingly vague. Even when one applies the Aristotelian formula to a specific context, one merely sets the terms of the debate into sharper relief, but without beginning to give an answer. The answer is provided by a substantive value judgment, laying outside the equality formula. As Kelsen notes, «any desired difference can thus be ranked as essential in the treatment of its subjects by an actual legal order, and hence be the basis of differential treatment, without the regime thereby coming into conflict with the principle of equality. This principle is too empty to be able to determine the content of a legal system».⁶

Most authors agree in qualifying the Aristotelian formula as an «empty form»,⁷ an «empty idea»,⁸ or a «simple tautology».⁹ But there is disagree-Page 47ment on the status of the substantive values which are incorporated in the formal framework. According to one view, recently restated in an article by Peter Westen which has sparked off a heated debate in the United States,¹⁰ those substantive values do not themselves belong to the equality complex, but are autonomous notions of right and entitlement. Clothing these values in terms of equality is not only useless, but also misleading, because it impedes a straightforward discussion of the moral values involved. As Alf Ross forcefully affirmed: «to present them as a demand of justice founded on an evident idea of equality in sharp practice aimed at bestowing on certain practical postulates determined by interest the apparent evidence which belongs to the idea of equality»,¹¹ Therefore, «equality as an idea should be banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory norm».¹²

Others have argued, on the contrary, that the formal framework of equality, far from confusing the debate, might be an enlightening instrument of analysis, which helps making explicit the implicit criteria or value judgments which underlie the distribution of rights.¹³ The more basic counter-argument is that the material side forms an integral part of the right to equality, and indicates a conscious societal choice to constitutionalise certain values that are not already covered by other fundamental rights. This content can be found in the historical and social context in which the right to equality was adopted or is still operating in every single constitutional system; as Kenneth Karst tersely wrote: «Equality, as an abstraction, may be value-neutral, but the fourteenth amendment is not.»¹⁴ It is true that many clearcut cases can be solved in this way: red hair is not an admissible differentiating criterion for tax purposes; the colour of one's skin should not be considered for matters of access to public transportation; social security allowances should not be reserved for one language group, etc. Yet, a considerable uncertainty con-Page 48tinues to exist on the appropriate interpretation of the equality dictate in a large number of situations.

Because of those two characteristics —the ubiquity of its scope, and the open-endedness of its meaning— equality has a potentially disruptive effect on the legal system. As it is enshrined in most constitutions, it raises delicate problems as to the respective roles of political and judicial bodies. The remainder of this Chapter will consider the various strategies that exist in order to mitigate this disruptive effect. They can be grouped in two categories: first, the (largely unsuccessful) effort to restrict the scope of the equality principle, by excluding certain domains and norms from its reach (Section 1); and secondly, the groping efforts to establish some 'objective' guiding principles as to the substantive meaning of equality (Section 2). Both analyses will of course be conducted in relation to the specific context of linguistic equality.

The concept of equality has undergone, in recent decades, an important doctrinal refinement from a rather formal rule prohibiting overt discriminations into a central element of every constitutional order with complex substantive ramifications, implying a duty to differentiate among societal groups according to their specific needs. This new interpretation of equality is also gradually trickling down to the specific field of linguistic equality, and this article wants to contribute to the growing awareness that many measures for the protection of linguistic minorities should not so much be considered as 'specific minority rights', but rather as concrete applications of the general principle of equality. Analysing those measures within the framework of general fundamental rights theory rather than under the heading of 'minority rights' is perhaps more promising for the linguistic groups involved. Indeed, special 'language rights' or 'minority rights' tend to appear as supplementary measures, as derogations from a basic pattern needing some special justification. They do not benefit from an aura of «inherent rights of man» which makes of fundamental rights such a strong weapon in political argumentation, but are considered as strictly dependent on the peculiarities of a given country, and the good-will of its authorities. Opponents can easily invoke the argument that the introduction of special measures for a particular group is contrary to a basic principle of liberal democratic theory, that of the universal guarantee of rights to each citizen. I wanted to show, on the contrary, that a protection against linguistic assimilation can be read in the principle of equality, and therefore forms part of the best democratic tradition. Democracy, in the cultural as in other domains, means the recognition of the right to be different.

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^* The following text is a slightly modified chapter from the author's doctoral thesis on The Protection of Linguistic Diversity through Fundamental Rights, defended at the European University Institute on 15 April 1985 (members of the jury: prof. Cappelletti and Weiler (European University Institute), De Meyer (University of Leuven), Me"ny (University of Paris II) and Pizzorusso (University of Florence). © B. De Witte.

[1] O. Weinberger, «Gleichheitspostulate - Eine strukturtheoretische und rechtspolitische Betrachtung», in Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Oeffentliches Recht und Voel-kerrecht, 1974, 23-38, at 26.

[2] P. Westen, «To Lure the Tarantula from its Hole: A Response», in Columbia Law Review, 1983, 1186-1208, at 1189.

[3] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1134 c I.

[4] H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, at 159. See also H. Batiffol, according to whom the principle of equality «oblige (...) a analyser les situations dans leurs contextures objectives, c'est-à-dire au-delà des sujets qui y sont parties, et qui tiennent aux modes de la vie socialeo (Problèmes de base de philosophic du droit, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1979, at 406).

[5] J, H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980, at 32. See also H. L. A. Hart, op. cit., at 154: «justice-as-equality may be levelled against almost any rule, because almost every rule is distributive, directly or indirectly».

[6] H. Kelsen, «What is Justice?», in Essays in Legal and Moral Philosophy, Dordrecht/Boston, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973, at 15.

[7] H. L. R. Hart, op. cit., at 155.

[8] P. Westen, «The Empty Idea of Equality», in Harvard Law Review, 1982, 537-596.

[9] Id., at 547-548: «Equality is an undeniable and unchangeable moral truth because it is a simple tautology». See also, in the same sense, O. Weinberger, op. cit., at 29; P, G. Polyviou, The Equal Protection of the Laws, London, Duckworth, 1980, at 7.

[10] P. Westen, «The Empty Idea...», op. cit., and the following reactions and replies: S. J. Burton, «Comment on 'Empty Ideas': Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules», in Yale Law Journal, 1982, 1136-1152; P. Westen, «On Confusing Ideas: Reply», in Yale Law Journal, 1982, 1153-1165; E. Chemerinsky, «In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westens, in Michigan Law Review, 1983, 575-599; A. D'Amato, «Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?», in Michigan Law Review, 1983, 600-603; P. Westen, «The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, and Morals: A Reply», in Michigan Law Review, 1983, 604-663; K, Greenawalt, «How Empty is the Idea of Equality», in Columbia Law Review, 1983, 1167-1185; P. Westen, «To Lure the Tarantula...», op. cit.

[11] A. Ross, On Law and Justice, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974, at 274.

[12] P. Westen, «The Empty Idea...», op. cit., at 542.

[13] O. Weinberger, op. cit., at 31.

[14] K. Karst, «The Supreme Court —1976 Term— Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment», in Harvard Law Reviw, 1977, 1-68, at 7; K. Gree-naval, op. cit., at 1180 ff. Section 1: The Scope of Equality

[15] J. R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966, at 246. This conception of equality could therefore be called 'heteronomical equality' (see J. Jimenez Campo, «La igualdad juridica coma límite frente al legislador», in Revisla Española de Derecho Constitutional, 1983, 71-114, at 74).

[16] K. Hesse, «Der Gleichheitsgrundsatz im Staacsrecht», in Archiv des oeffentlchen Rechts, 1951-52, 167-224, at 175.

[17] J. R. Lucas, op. cit., at 253.

[18] J. Jimenez Campo, op. cit., at 74: «es en esta universalización de la condición de ciudadano, en la abolición del privilegio y en la consiguiente destruction de ambitos inmunes al poder legislativo del Estado donde reside la aportacion inicial —válida aún— del primer constitucionalismo». Very characteristic in this regard is the Preamble to the 1791 French Constitution, which provides a catalogue of existing status inaquelities: «L'Assemblee nationale, voulant etablir la Constitution francaise sur les principes qu'elle vient de reconnaitre et de declarer, abolit irreVocablement les institutions qui blessaient la liberte et l'egalité des droits. II n'y a plus ni noblesse, ni pairie, ni distinctions héréditaires, ni distinctions d'ordres, ni regime feodal, ni justices patrimonials, ni aucun des litres, denominations et prerogatives qui en derivaient, ni aucun ordre de chevalerie, ni aucune des corporations ou decorations, pour lesquelles on exigeait des preuves de noblesse, ou qui supposaient des distinctions de naissance; ni aucune autre superiorité que celle des fonctionnaires publics dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions. Il n'y a plus ni vdnalite' ni he'redite d'aucun office public. Il n'y a plus, pour aucune partie de la Nation, ni pour aucun individu, aucun privilege, ni exception au droit commun de tous les Francais (...)».

[19] H. Kelsen, op. cit., at 15.

[20] G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, at 141.

[21] D. Kennedy, « Legal Formality», in Journal of Legal Studies, 1973, 351-398, at 369-370. Yet, as this author adds, those possible future amendments by the legislator will be predetermined by the outcomes of all the individual formal applications of the original rule. Rule application is therefore not neutral in terms of justice (id., at 385 ff.).

[22] R. Stewart, «The Reformation of American Administrative Law», in Harvard Law Review, 1975, 1669-1813, at 1675.

[23] H. L. A. Hart, op. tit., at 124-125.

[24] See e.g. P. Vedel & P. Delvolvb, Droit administratij, Paris, P.U.F., 1980 (7th ed), at 421 ff.

[25] S. Sandulli, Manuale di diritto amministrativo, Napoli, Jovene, 1982 (13th ed), Vol I, at 523 ff.

[26] E. Forsthoff, Lehrbuch des Verwaltungrrechts, I, Muenchen, C. H. Beck, 1973 (10th ed), at 81 ff.; H. U. Erichsen & W. Martens (eds), Allegemeines Verwaltungs-rech, Berlin, de Gruyter, 1977 (2nd ed), at 151 ff. For a more sociological distinction between'Zweckprogramme'and'Konditionalprogramm',see N.Luhmann,«Lob der Routine», in Verwdtungsarchiv, 1964, 1-33. As for the other countries, see G. Ress, «Judicial Protection of the Individual against Unlawful or Arbitrary acts of the Executives, in Judicial Protection against the Executive, Koeln, Carl Heymanns & Dobbs Ferry, Oceana, 1971, Vol. 3, 47-76, at 70, with further references to the national reports in the first two volumes.

[27] France is the most conspicuous example: Att. 37 of the Constitution empowers the government to enact quasi-legislative 'regiements'; see Le domaine de la loi et du reglement, Paris, Economica & Aix, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 1981 (2nd ed). Situating the French case in a comparative context, M. Cappelletti, «Loi et règlement en droit compare: partage de competences et controle de constitutionnalit6>, id., 247-255. Such 'independent' administrative activity also exists, e.g. in the United Kingdom:see the police cases discussed by H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982 (5th ed), at 359 ff.

[28] For some exceptions, particularly with regard to normative acts of the executive, see G. Ress, op. cit., at 72 ff.

[29] H. L. A. Hart, op. cit., at 124.

[30] In Germany, for instance, the concept of legality is not stretched beyond its original, formal, meaning, and equality has therefore a decisive role to play in the control of administrative discretion; see E. Stein, «Art. 3», in Kommentar zum Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Neuwied/Darmstadt, Luchterhand, 1984, at 400 ff.; and A. Podlech, Gehalt und Funklionen des allgemeinen verfassungsrechtlichen Glei-chheitssatzes, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1971, at 117 ff. The same is true in Austria (see Th. Oehlinger, «Objet et portée de la protection des droits fondamentaux - Cour constitutionnelle autrichienne», in Revue Internationale de droit compare, 1981, 543-579, at 571), and in Switzerland (Y. Hangartner, Grundzuege des schweizerischen Staatsrechts, Zuerich, Schulthess, 1982, vol. II, at 185).

[31] On the role of the 'reasonableness' doctrine in 'ultra vires' review in Britain, see Wade, op. cit., at 353 ff. For Norway (with references to other Scandinavian countries), see E. Boe, «Court Review of Free Administrative Discretion in Norway», in Scandinavian Studies in Law, 1983, 11-35.

[32] In France, legality is still the overall ground of administrative review, but it hasbecomeanaltogetherdifferent concept,whichnolongermeans'conformityto statutes' but 'conformity to all higher law', including the Constitution and general principles of law. Only in this sense can one explain that the autonomous 'règlements' are subject to 'legality' review, as the 'Conseil d'Etat' decided in the Syndicat général des Inginieurs-Conseils case (decision of 26 June 1959, in M. Long, P. Weil, G. Braibant, Les grands arrets de la jurisprudence administrative, Paris, Sirey, 1978 (7th ed), at 482). Equality is one of those general principles; it is also, of course, a written constitutional principle, but «le Conseil d'Etat préfère y voir des principes généraux valables indépendamment de tout texte: if evite ainsi de lier leur sort aux avatars des changements constitutionnelss (P. Weil, Le droit daministratif, Paris, P.U.F., 1975 (6th ed), at 87). Equality therefore plays a distinctive role as one of the sub-categories of the overall principle of legality; see e.g. the analysis of P. Delvolve, Le principe d'égalité devant les charges publiques, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1969, Part I.

[33] On the concept of judicial review, its various models and its recent expansion in a number of countries, see generally M. Cappelletti, judicial Review in the Contemporary World, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Meriill, 1971; L. Favoreu (ed), Cours constitutionnelles el droits jondamentaux, Paris, Economica, 1982; L. Favoreu, «Actualité et legitimité du controle juridictionnel des lois en Europe occidentale», in Revue de Droit Public, 1984, 1147-1201.

[34] The terminological distinction used here is the one proposed by H. Kelsen, Reirte Rechtslehre, Wien, Franz Deuticke 1960 (2nd ed), at 146 and 396. But it is frequently disregarded in practice. Many countries, where equality operates as a check on the legislator, define it in their Constitution as 'equality before the law': see art. 3.1 of the German Basic Law, art. 3.1 of the Italian Constitution, art. 14 of the Spanish, and art. 40.1 of the Irish Constitution.

[35] The French Conseil Constitutionnel applied the equality principle for the first time in its decision of 27 December 1973, that is, fifteen years after the adoption of the 1958 Constitution which introduced judicial review. In the United States, to quote another example, the recent flourishing of equality review should not hide the fact that the older case-law held that the legislator may freely establish classifications, as long as these are impartially applied: Missouri Pacific v Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885) and Powell v Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).

[36] See H. H. B.UPP, «Art. 3 als Masstab verfassungsgerichtlicher Gesetzeskontrolle», in hundesverjassungsgericht und Grundgesetz, II, Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Sie-beck), 1976, 364-389, at 369. The case law of the Constitutional Court is not entirely consistent however.

[37] C. Esposito, «Eguaglianza e giustizias, in La Costituzione italiana. Saggi, Padova, CEDAM, 1954, 17-66, at 30 ff.; and L. Paladin, «Eguaglianla (diritto costituzionale)», in Enciclopedia del Diritto, XIV, Milano, Giuffre, 1965, 519-551, at 525.

[38] Judgment n. 80 of 14 April 1969, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1969, 1141, at 1147. L. Paladin adopts this view in «La legge come norma e come provvedimento», in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1969, 871-897; see also, along the same lines, C. Mortati, htituzioni di diritto pubblico, Padova, CEDAM, 1976, 9th ed., II, at 1021-1022.

[39] Taxe professionnelle case, decision of 9 January 1980, in Dalloz-Sirey, 1980, 420.

[40] Note, «The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause», in Yale Law Journal, 1962, 330-367. See the Supreme Court judgment in City of New Orleans v Duke, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), upholding a city ordinance applying to selected persons.

[41] InIreland, however, personal laws would seem to be impermissible in se, according to the Supreme Court in East Donegal Cooperative Livestock Mart Ltd v Attorney General, in Irish Reports 1970, 317; see the comment by M. Forde, «Equality and the Constitution» in The Irish Juris, 1982, 295-339, at 303-305.

[42] G. Marshall, op. tit., at 137.

[43] There is also an important linguistic dimension to those 'procedutal guarantees'; see infra, p. 105.

[44] See, above all, J. Raz, «The Rule of Law and its Virtues», in Law Quarterly Review, 1977, 195-211. Also E. Bodeuheimer, Treatise on Justice, New York, Philosophical Library Inc., 1967, at 11: «(...) the rule of law does not exhaust its significance in the institutionalisation of legality, but in addition requires for its realization a modicum of substantive rationality in law and the recognition of at least some minimum standards of due process».

[45] See the recent (but undoubtedly vain) attempt of a French author to temper the recent activism of the Conseil Constitutionnel in its enforcement of the equality principle: Ch. Leben, «Le Conseil Constitutionnel et le principe d'égalité devant la loi», in Revue de Droit Public, 1982, 295-353. According to Leben, substantive equality tests should be limited, apart from the explicit grounds listed in art. 2 of the 1958 Constitution (origin, race and religion), to the 'e'galite' devant la justice' (at p. 316-317 and 353).

[46] In practice but not in theoryAs we saw, the absence of judicial review does not mean that the Constitution is not a 'higher law' binding on the legislator. See above, p. 108 ff.

[47] P. G. Polyviou, op. cit., at 12. A number of supporters of this presumption are mentioned in P. 'Westen, «The Empty Idea...», op. cit., at note 118.

[48] H. L. A. Hart, op. cit., at 158.

[49] A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Beings. A Study of the History of an Idea, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1964.

[50] See e.g. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, 1972, at 504 ff.; P. G. Polyviou, op. cit., at 8 ff.; G. Sartori, Democratic Theory, Westport, Greenwood Press ,1973, at 331; D. A. J. Richards, «Rights and Autonomy», in Ethics, Oct. 1981, 3-20, at 17 ff. For a recent critical discussion of the assumptions of this theory, see D. A. Lloyd Thomas, «Equality Within the Limits of Reason Alone», in Mind, Oct. 1979, 538-553.

[51] H. L. A. Hart, op. cit., at 158.

[52] P. G. Polyviou, op. cit., at 13.

[53] G, Sartori, op. cit., at 330.

[54] I Berlin, «Equality as an Ideals, in F. Olafson (ed), justice and Social Policy, 1961, 128 ff., at 131.

[55] «L'égalité ce n'est pas la coexistence dans la horde. Creation de la société humaine elle apparalt lorsque celle-ci, quittant ses formes les plus primitives, passe a une division du travail annonciatrice à travers la division sociale, de la constitution en classes, de l'inégalité voulue des homines » (H, Buch, «La notion d'égalité dans les principes généaux du droit», in L'Egalité, Vol. I, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1971, 196-225, at 212).

[56] An obiter dictum in the Judgment of 11 December 1974, in Arrets du tribunal fédéral, 100 la, 322, at 329.

[57] This is, of course, a simplification of the real-world alternatives as regards the status of a language in the classroom. A given language can be: entirely excluted from the program; used as a pedagogical tool in order to facilitate the teaching of, or in, another language; taught as a subjec in its own right, but outside the normal program (as an optional course, during extra hours); taught as a subject in the normal curriculum, during a varying number of hours; used as one of the media of instruction, alongside another language; used as the exclusive medium of instruction (except, eventually, for the teaching of other languages).

[58] P. Westen, «The Empty Idea...», op. cit., at 574.

[59] See e.g. J. J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Paris, Garnier-Flammarion, 1966, at 70:«Ainsi par la nature du pacte, tout acte de souverainete, c'est-a-dire tout acte authentique de la volonté générale, oblige ou favorise egalement tous les citoyens, en sorte que le souverain connait seulement le corps de la nation et ne distingue aucun de ceux qui la composent».

[60] E. Cheherinsky, op. cit., at 590.

[61] Railway Express Agency v New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), at 111-113.

[62] Palmer v Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).

[63] Gomillion v Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (the Alabama legislature changed the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee from a square into a bizarre twenty-eight-side figure; nearly all the black voters, but none of the white, were thus removed from the city limits).

[64] See the recent Supreme Court judgment in City of Mobile v Balden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), where a facially neutral electoral system was upheld because the discriminatory intent of the legislator could not be proven. The presumption of validity for a uniform rule has therefore the rather paradoxical effect of precluding effective remedies against indirect racial discriminations; see the Note, «Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law», in Yale Law Journal, 1982, 328-351.

[65] A. France, Le lys rouge.

[66] G. Marshall, Constitutional Theory, op. tit., at 153.

[67] E. Allardt, «Le minoranze etniche nell'Europa occidentale; una ricerca comparata», in Rivista italiana di scienza politico, 1981, 91-136, at 129:«Un tempo erano soprattutto le maggioranze che operavano la categorizzazione e l'etichettura delle minoranze. Lo scopo principale della categocizzazione era l'esclusione: le maggioranze agivano in modo da salvaguardare i loro privilegi materiali o per perseguitare le minoranze (...) adesso sono soprattutto le minoranze ad aperare le categorizzazioni. La mancanza di sensibilità della maggioranza non si estrinseca piu come discriminazione ma come negazione dell'identità che invece la maggioranza enfatizza».

[68] On affirmative action, see below, p. Ill ff.

[69] See e.g. Note, «Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality», in Harvard Law Review, 1981, 487-508, esp, at 487: «Women ate thus convinced to demand no more, and often substantially less, than the chance to assimilate themselves into existing educational, labor and other social institutions - rather than to demand that the institutions change to meet women's needs as they see thems; and at 487488: «(...) the goal of sexual equality» (as currently understood) «is to create a world in which persons of both genders are encouraged to act as men currently do and in which current 'female behavior' will gradually wither away».

[70] «A law is under-inclusive where it imposes burdens on one group but not on another essentially similar group; or where, in allocating certain benefits, it grants them to some groups but not to others who, in the light of the law's objective, are in a situation essentially similar to the former» (M. Forde, «Equality and the Constitution...», op. cit., at 314).

[71] «A law is over-inclusive where it imposes burdens on various groups, some of which are not in fact within the 'mischief the law was designed to combat; or, alternatively, where the law grants benefits, inter alia, to groups which in fact should not be beneficiaries in the light of the law's overriding goals» (ibid.).

[72] A characteristic pronouncement in this sense was given by the German Constitutional Court in its judgement of 28 November 1967 (in Bundesverfassungsgericbtsent-scheidungen 22, 349, at 361-362): «Das Bundesverfassungsgericht darf daher bei Feststellung des Verfassungsverstosses nicht selbst die verletzte Gleichheit wiederherstellen, indent es die gesetzliche Verguenstigung auf die uebergangene Personengruppe ausdehnt, weil es damit der Entscheidung des Gesetzgebers vorgreifen wuerde».

[73] M. Forde, op. cit., at 337.

[74] See e.g. Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Weinberger v Wiesenjeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).

[75] R. B. Ginsburg, «Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional legislations, in Cleveland State Law Review, 1979, 301-324, at 324; see also, Note, «Extension versus Invalidation of Underinclusive Statutes: A Remedial Alternative», in Columbia journal of Law and Social Problems, 1975, 115 ff.; for a more critical voice, see G. E. Frug, «The Judicial Power of the Purse», in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1978, 715-794.

[76] See e.g. the judgement of the Constitutional Court of 11 July 1975, in Fora Italiano, 1975, I,1882, with note by A. Pizzorusso;see further the discussion by G. Zagrebelsky, La giustizia costituzionale, Bologna, II Mulino, 1977, at 156-165; and N. Picardi, «Le sentenze 'integrative' della Corte costituzionale», in Scritti in onore di Costantino Mortati, Milano, giuffrè, 1977, vol. 4, 597-634.

[78] Council of State, decision of 22 March 1950, Société des ciments français, in Recueil Lebon, 1950, 175; decision of 13 July 1963, Aureille, in Recueil Lebon, 1963, 829. See Ch. Wolfees, «Note sur le principe d'e'galité dans la jurisprudence du Conseil d'Etat francais en matière de réglementation économique», in L'Egalité, Vol. I, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1971, 127-137, at 132.

[79] F. Miclo, «Le principe d'egalité et la constitutionnalité des lois», in Actualité juridique - droit administratif, 1982, 115-131, at 128: «lorsque le legislateur intervient a l'egard de categories de personnes se trouvant dans des situations différentes, il a le choix entre édicter des regies identiques ou stipuler des regimes particuliers à chaque categoric (...) Le juge constitutionnel refuse, semble-t-il, de donner un contenu négatif a l'egalité, ce qui équivaudrait à créer un véritable 'droit à la difference's.

[80] «Considérantque le principe d'e'galite' impose seulement qu'à des situations semblables soient appliquées les memes regies et qu'il n'interdit pas qu'à des situations non semblables soient appliquées des règies différentes» (Taxe projessionnelle case, cit.). For references to other cases, using quasi-identical language, see Ch. Leben, op. tit., at 314-315.

[81] According to the German Constitutional Court, Art. 3 imposes «weder wesent-lich Gleiches willkuerlich ungleich, noch wesentlich Ungleiches willkuerlich gleich zu behandeln». The rule has been formulated in one of its earliest decisions (in Bundes-verfassungsgerichtsentscbeidungen, 1, 14, at 52), and has since constantly been repeated (see e.g. id., 4, 143 at 155; id., 15, 167 at 201; id., 27, 364 at 371). The Swiss Federal Tribunal takes the same view; see e.g. the judgment of 27 January 1963, in Arrets du tribunal federal 89 I 36, and further id. 94 I 654; id 104 la 295; id. 104 Ib 210. In Italy, see the judgement of th Constitutional Court of 29 March 1960, in Foro Italiano 1960, I, 538, confirmed many times since (see e.g. the analysis of case-law by L. Paladin, «Corte costituzionale e principio generale d'eguaglianza. Aprils 1979-dicembre 1983», in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1984, I, 219-262, at 227 it. See also the Italian, Austrian and American cases quoted in the next section).

[82] Infra, p. 96 ff., 103; 106 ff.

[83] Language does not figure among the grounds listed in art. 1.1 of the new Dutch Constitution, art. 4.1 of the Swiss Constitution, art, 2 of the French Constitution of 1958, art. 14 of the Spanish Constitution. For those countries, therefore, the question whether the enumeration has got legal consequences is not directly relevant for the purposes of this study. On the other hand, some grounds of classification con be made the object of special judicial attention even in the absence of a special mention by the Constitution; see the theory of 'suspect classifications' in American constitutional law, on which see infra, p. 75 and 121.

[84] Supra, p. 45.

[85] See Maunz-Z:ppelius, Deutsches Staatsrecht, Muenchen, C. H. Beck, 24th ed, 1982, at 197; E. Stein, op. cit., at 399; E. Klein, «The Principle of Equality and its Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany», in T. Koopmans (ed), The Constitutional Protection of Equality, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1975, 69-124, at 87.

[86] See C. Mortati, Istitutzioni di diritto pubblico, Padova, CEDAM, 9th ed, 1976, II, 1019; L. Paladin, aEguaglianza (diritto costituzionale)», in Enciclopedia del Diritto, XIV, Milano, Giuffre, 1965, 519-551, at 532.

[87] Judgment of 3 October 1958, n. 56, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1958, 861 (with notes by V. Cribafulli andC. Esposito).

[88] Judgement of 28 november 1961, n. 64, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1961, 1224 (with note by C. Esposito).

[89] Judgement of 10 May 1957, in Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen, 6, 389, at 423.

[90] In Id., 21, 343.

[91] For a German case denying the need for differentiations in the context of language use, see infra, p. 105,

[92] L. Paladin, «Corte costituzionale e principio generale d'eguaglianza...», op. cit,, at 258, See also the views of A. Pizzorusso, Lezioni di diritto costituzionale, Roma, Edizioni de 'Il Foro Italiano' (2nd ed), 1981, at 159: «I1 divieto di discriminazioni fon-date sul sesso, la razza, la lingua, la religione, le opinioni politiche, le condizioni personali e sociali, piuttosto che comportare un'esclusione tassativa di qualunque discussione circa la razionalità o l'oportunità di discriminazioni siffatte, assume la portata di un projnemoria volto a segnalare quell i che sono stati in passato i piu frequenti fattori in base ai quali sono state compiute ingiustificate discriminazioni, L'elenco di questi fattori, di conseguenza, rappresenta bensi un monito per il legislatore, per il giudice della costituzionalità delle leggi e per chiunque altro a non ricadere negli errori del passato, ma non esime una regola rigida che imponga o escluda qualunque differenziazione».

[93] On this 'ordiary' equality est, see below, p. 68 ff.

[94] On art. 6, see below, p. 89.

[95] In Austria, 98 of the 113 annulations decided by the Constitutional Court during the period 1946-1977 were based on the equality clause (Th. Oehlinger, «Objet et ported de la protection des droits fondamentaux - Cour constitutionnelle autrichienne», in Revue International de Droit Compari, 1981, 543-579, at 574); in Italy, more than 75 % of all cases submitted to the Constitutional Court in recent years were based, wholly or in part, on the right to equality (L. Paladin, «Corte costituzionale e principio generale d'eguaglianza. Aprile 1979 - dicembre 1983», in Giurisprudenza Constituzionale, 1984, I, 219-262, at 219-220). Similar trends can be witnessed in France (L. Favoreu, «La jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel en 1980s, in Revue de Droit Public, 1981, 621-649, at 635) and in Spain (Cruz Villalon, «Zwei Jabre Verfassungsrechtsprechung», in Zeitschrijt juer auslaendisches oeffentliches Recbt und Voelkerrecbt, 1983, 70-117, at 92).

[96] See e.g. the discussion by M. Cappelletti, «The 'Mighty Problem' of Judicial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis», in Legal Issues of European Integration, 1979, 1-29; and Id., aNecessiti et legitimite de la justice constitutionnelk», in Revue Internationale de Droit Compare,1981, 625-657. Other recent contributions to this perennial debate include J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980; J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process, Chicago/Lond, Chicago University Press, 1980; M. J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights, New Haven London, Yale U.P., 1982; E. Garcia de Enterria, La Constitucidn como norma y el Tribunal Constituciond, Madrid, Ed. Civitas, 1981; L. Favoreu, «Actualite et legitimite du controle juridictionnel des lois en Europe occidentale», in Revue de Droit Public, 1984, 1147-1201; «Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Gefuege der Staatsfunktionen», reports by Korinek, Mueller and Schlaich in Veroef-fentlicbungen der Vereinigung von deutschen Staatsrechtslebrern, Vol. 39, Berlin/New York, W. de Gruyter, 1981; Corte Costituzionale e sviluppo delta forma di governo in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1982;the contributions by Eli A, Caretti& Cheli, De Vita, Lanchester and Rolla in Quaderni Costituzionali, 1984, n. 1, 7-141.

[97] M. Forde, «Equality and the Constitution», in The Irish Jurist, 1982, 295-339, at 310.

[98] 'Rationality' is the term used by the American Supreme Court; 'ragionevolezza' by the Italian Constitutional Court; 'razonabilidad' in Spain.

[99] The concept of 'Willkuer' (arbitrariness) as the central interpretative standard in equality litigation was originally developed by G. Leibholz, Die Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz, 1925, 72 ff., and is now currently used by the constitutional courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland and Austria.

[100] See the phrase of H. L. A. Hart quoted above, p. 46.

[101] Decision of 17 January 1979, in Dalloz-Sirey 1981, 117 (as translated by M. Forde, op. cit., at 317).

[102] See e.g. the references to the 'nationalisations case' in Ch. Leben, «Le Conseil constitutionnel et le principe d'egalité devant la loi», in Revue de Droit Public, 1982, 295-353, at 327. The 'general interest' is also the criterion generally used by the 'Conseil d'Etat' in its equality case law; see the references in C. A. Colliard, Libertés publiques, Paris, Dalloz, 1975 (5th ed), at 208-209.

[103] The Italian Constitutional Court has not always used a consistent terminology. Yet it has been shown it usually resorts to objective purpose analysis, with some exceptions where it inquired in the effective purpose of the legislator (see A. S. Agro, «Art. 34, in G. Branca (ed), Commentario della Costituzione - Principi Fondamentali, Bologna, Za-nichelli & Roma, Ed. de II Foro Italiano, 1975, 123-161, at 143 and 146-147). In Spain, see the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of 2 July 1981, in Boletin de jurisprudencia Constitutional, 1981, n. 4, 243, at 250: «la igualdad es só1o violada si la desigualdad está desprovista de una justificación objetiva y razonable y la existencia de dicha justification debe apreciarse en relación a la finalidad y efectos de la medida considerada, debiendo darse una relación razonable de proporcionalidad entre los medios empleados y la finalidad perseguida». In Belgium, see e.g. the Council of State decision of 1 February 1973, in Pasicrisie 1974, IV, 109, at 110: «l'article 6 de la Constitution n'interdit pas qu'à des situations differentes soient appliquées des règies juridiques différentes, pour autant que les différenciations ainsi établies soient fondées sur l'intéret public, qu'elles aient donc un but en rapport avec cet inte'ret (...)».

[104] For Germany, see the judgement of the Constitutional Court of 17 March 1959 (to which the Court consistently refers ever since), in Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheid-ungen, 9, 201, at 206: the legislator violates equality when he «versaeumt, tatsaechliche Gleichheiten oder Ungleichheken der zu ordnenden Lavensverhaeltnisse zu beruecksichtigen, die so bedeutsam sind, dass sie bei einer am Gerechtigkeitsgedanken orientierten Betrachtungsweise beachtet werden muessen». For Austria, see R. Rack & N. Wimmer, «Das Gleichheitsrecht in Oesterreich», in Europaeische Grundrechte Zeitschrijt, 1983, 597-613, at 603-604 (and the judgments of the Constitutional Court quoted in their notes 78 and 79).

[105] The test is not objective in the sense that it restricts itself to the terms used in the regulation, but rather in the sense that the judge tries to define the societal object the legislation regulation regulates, disregarding the motives why the ruletnaker wanted to regulate it.

[106] See above, p. 65.

[107] Judgment of 16 June 1983, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1983, I, 946.

[108] The subjective rationality test has been classically formulated by Tussman & Ten Broek, «The Equal Protection of the Laws», in California Law Review, 1949, 341 ff. For recent discussions of the dilemmas involved in purpose inquiry, see e.g. Note, «Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protections, in Yale Law Journal, 1972, 123-154; J. H. Ely, «Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law», in Id., 1970, 1203-1341; G. Binion, «Intent and Equal Protection: A Reconsiderations, in The Supreme Court Review, 1983, 397-457, esp. at 424 ff.

[109] For a recent analysis of this shift see C. E. Baker, «Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The Substantive Content of Equal Protection»., in University of Pennsylvania Law Review,1983, 933-998;at one point (976-977) this author argues that: «Although the Court often uses the language of subjective intent, its opinions can best be understood as treating objective or contextual purpose as' the key constitutional concerns.

[110] Note, «Legislative Purpose...»., op. cit., at132 (and the examples given at 132 ff.).

[111] Example given by S. M. Huang Thio, «Equal Protection and Rational Classifications, in Public Law, 1963, 412-440, at 418-419.

[112] Note, «Legislative Purpose...»., op, cit., at 124.

[113] Id., at 137.

[114] «In nome dell'eguaglianza questa Corte non è (...) abilitata a esetcitare scelte di esclusiva spettanza del legislatore, ma puo solo ricondurre le deroghe ingiustificate e le arbitrarie eccezioni alle regole già stabilite dalla legge ovvero ai principi generali univocamente desumibili dall'ordinamentos (judgment of 18 October 1983, in Giurisprudenza Constituzionale, 1983, 2062).

[115] One is, in a sense, referred back to the subjective intention of the rulemaker, but then taken in globo, and not in reference to the particular regulation.

[116] E. Klein, «The Principle of Equality and its Protection in the Federal Republic of Germany»., in T. Koopmans (ed), The Constitutional Protection of Equality, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1975, 69-124, at 78:«Tbe argumentation of adequacy with regard to the system presupposes a certain determination and delimitation of various fields of life, for each of these is subject to a different system. Whether a provision fits into a system can only be decided in relation to that system. The equality clause cannot be used to impose assimilation of various fields of life»,

[117] Judgment of 16 June 1959, in Buttdesverfassungsgerichtsentscbeidungen, 9, 338, at 349.

[118] In Germany, see e.g., in addition to the judgment mentioned in the previous note, the judgments of 25 July 1960 in Bundesverfassungsgericblsenlscheidungen, 11, 283, at 293;and 27 January 1965, in id., 18, 315, at 334. For a complete overview, see E. Klein, op. c'tt., at 78 it.; H. H. Rupp, «Art. 3 GG als Massstab verfassungsgerichtlicher Gesetzeskontrolle»., in Bundesverfassungsgericht und Grundgesetz, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1976, II, 364-389, at 379 ff. In Italy, see the recent overview by L. Paladin, op. cit., who argues (at 229 ff.) that all the equality opinions of the Constitutional Court can be analysed in terms of systematic rationality.

[119] G. Zagrebelsky, «Corte costituzionale e principle d'uguaglianza», in N. Occhiocupo (ed), La Carle costituzionle tra norma giuridica e realtà socide. Bilancio di vent'anni di attività, Bologna, II Mulino, 1978, 103-120, at 110; and A. Baldassarre, «Intervento» in id., 121-132, at 125:«Ma che l'ordinamento normativo costituisca un 'sistema', nel senso proprio della parola, dotato di una razionalità sua propria tanto forte e manifests da potersi far valere anche contro singoli atti del suo stesso fattore, e un postulato indimostrato». For similar criticisms in German legal doctrine, see C. Degenhart, Systemgerecbtigkett und Selbstbindung des Gesetzgebers als Verfassungspostulat, Muenchen, Beck, 1976, at 49-57; H. F. Zacher, «Soziale Gleichheit», in Archiv des oeffentlichen Rechts, 1968, 341-383, at 352-355.

[120] «Amministrativizzazione della politica» (A. Baldassrre, op. cit., at 125).

[121] Judgment n. 5862/1968, quoted in R. Rack & N. Wimmer, op. cit., at 604.

[122] See the judgments of the German Constitutional Court of 7 May 1969, in Bundesveriassungsgerichtsentscheidungen, 25, 372, at 401-402; and of 2 October 1969, in Id., 27, 58, at 65.

[123] A French 'Ordonnance' of 13 September 1945, which is still in force, orders that all periodicals published in Alsace must have a minimum content of 25 % written in French —including all sports and youth features.

[124] To give again an example in language law: the French 'Loi sur l'emploi de la langue française' of 31 December 1975 restricts the use of other languages than French in commercial activity and labour relations. This should be analysed as a limit on the freedom of expression through the language of one's choice. This limit may in itself be justified by the need to protect the integrity of the French language against the commercial dominance of English; but why then should other languages (including France's regional minority languages and the languages spoken by immigrants) be outlawed as well? Is the fact that all languages other than French are subject to the same restrictive regime not an unlawful equiparation?For more details, and similar examplesfrom other countries, see B. de Witte, The Protection of Linguistic Diversity through fundamental Rights, Florence, European University Institute (doctoral thesis), 1985, 260 ff.

[125] On interstate travel, Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); on the right to vote, Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and Reynolds v Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For a general description of the 'fundamental rights' theory, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law Mineola (N.Y.), The Foundation Press, 1978, 1002 ff.

[126] Cf. supra, p. 64 ff.

[127] For Italy, see e.g. G. Zagrebelsky, «Objet et portée de la protection des droits fondamentaux - Cour constitutionnelle italienne», in Revue Internationale de Broit Compare, 1981, 511-542, at 538, arguing that those special grounds have been 'absorbed' by the general principle of equality and are not subject to a different regime; see also above, p. 66. For Austria, see M. Bercer, «Die Gleichheit von Frau und Mann in Oesterreich»., in Europaeische Grundrechte Zeitschrift, 1983, 614-623, at 619; M. Sachs, «Der Geltungs-verlust des Art. 7 Abs. 1 Satz 2 B-VG», in Oesterreichiscbe Zehscbrift fuer Oeffentlicbes Rech 1985, 305-324 (who regrets this evolution in case law, but recognises its existence),

[128] See above, p. 65.

[129] See below, pp. 89-104.

[130] United States v Carotene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), at 152, n. 4. Beyond its specific role in equality litigation, this footnote is also considered to have started a new era in American constitutional law, by offering a theory which reconciles judicial review with the need to respect majoritain legislative decision-making: the primary task of the constitutional judge should be that of protecting the interests of those groups who are effectively excluded from the democratic decision-making. The theory has been most elaborately developed by J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, op. tit. For a recent analysis (and critique) of the impact of the 'Carolene Products' footnote, see B. A. Ackerman, «Beyond Carolene Products», in Harvard haw Review 1985, 713-746.

[131] Koremalsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Ironically, despite the alleged use of a strict scrutiny, the legislative discriminations againts the Japanese were upheld in this case.

[132] San Antonio v Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1975), at 28.

[133] The Hispanics are, in certain domains, worse off than the Blacks. For instance, in 1980, only 7.8 % of all persons of Hispanic origin had completed college studies, againts 8.8 % of blacks, and 18.5 % of 'whites' (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1984, at 144).

[134] Note, «Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection Law», in Yale Law Journal, 1982, 328-351, at 351.

[135] Cf. supra, pp. 43-44.

[136] Judgment of 15 October 1960, in Sammlang, 1960/3822, 507: «Eine Differenzierung der Anspruchsberechtigung im Rahmen des Opferfuersorgegesetz nach der Sprach-zugehoerigkeit oder der Herkunft aus dem deutschen Sprachgebiet und die Schlechter-stellung der Sprache einer Minderheit ist niemals sachlich. Denn die Sprachzugehoerigkeit steht zu Aufgabe und Zweck der Opferfuersorge in keinem sachlichen Zusammenhangw.

[137] Judgments of 25 January 1984, in Repertorio de Jurisprudencia Aranzadi, 1984, n. 205; and judgment o£ 3 May 1984 (not yet reported).

[138] Judgment of 25 January 1984, cit.,: «esta situation rompe el principio de igualdad del art. 14 de la vigente Constitución, en cuanto que se conculca el derecho de los españoles al acceso de las funciones públicas disminuido para todos aquellos que no sean parlantes del euskera (...)».

[139] Art, 6.1 of the Basque Statute (Organic Law of 18 december 1979): «E1 euskera, lengua propia del Pueblo Vasco, tendra, como el castellano, caracter de lengua oficial en Euskadi, y todas sus habitantes tienen el derecho a conocer y usar ambas lenguas».

[140] I. Agirreazkuenaga Zigurraga, «E1 euskera discrimina al castellano a juicio del Tribunal Supremo. La igualdad linguistics efectiva a debate», in Revista Vasca de Administración Pública, n. 9, 1984, 241-260. For another very harsh but, in my view, entirely justified critique of the Court's decision, see E. Gobreros Mendazona, «Cooficialidad lingufstica y discriminación por razon de la lengua», in Ctvitas. Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo, n. 42, 1984, 461-476.

[141] Judgment of 5 August 1983 (concerning a conflict of competence between the central State and several Autonomous Communities), in Boletin de Jurisprudence Constitutional, 1983, n. 30, 1121 at 1176:«Una interpretation sistemática de los preceptos constirutionales y estatutarios lleva, por una parte, a considerar el conocimiento de la lengua propia de la Comunidad como un merito para la provision de vacantes, pero, por otra, a atribuir el deber de conocimiento de dicha lengua a la Administración autonómica en su conjunto, no individualmente a coda uno de sus funcionarios, como modo de garantizar el derecho a usarla por parte de los ciudadanos de la respectiva Comunidad» (emphasis added).

[142] See art. 21.5 of the Law on the Use of Languages in Administrative Matters (coordinated version of 1966): «Nul ne peut etre nomme' ou promu à un emploi ou à une fonction mettant son titulaire en contact avec le public, s'il ne justifie oralement, par une epreuve complementaire ou un examen special, qu'il possede de la seconde langue une connaissance suffisante ou elementaire, approprie'e à la nature de lafonction à exercer». Note that civil servants that do not come into contact with the public need not be bilingual (except for the higher hierarchical levels). See, on these points, C. Wilwerth, Le status linguislique de la jonction publique beige, Bruxelles, Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1980, at 65-70.

[143] According to art. 39 of the Regional Statute of Val d'Aosta, both Italian and French shall be used in all classes, at all levels of the educational system within the Region.

[144] (National) Law of 16 May 1978; see, on this point, G. Mor, «Minoranze linguistiche», in S. Cassese (ed), Guida per le autonomie lotali, 1979, 418-420, at 420.

[145] This provisionis not contained in the Statute of the Region Trentino-Alto Adige, but in a later Decree (of 26 July 1976, art. 1) implementing art. 100 of the Statute (which guarantees the right to use either Italian or German in dealing with the public administration).

[146] Judgment of 18 October 1983, in Le Regioni, 1984, 238, at 255: «La parificazione delle lingue (...) esprime il rkonoscimento (...) del dovere di ogni cittadino, quale che sla ]a sua madre lingua, di essere in grado di coraunicare con tutti gli altti cittadini, quando è investito di funzioni pubbliche o è tenuto a prestare un servizio di pubblico interessev.

[147] Ibid.: the condition of bilingualism «ha come destinatari non soltanto i cittadini (rientranti in quelle categoric e operanti nella provincia di Bolzano) di lingua madre italiana, ma anche quelli di lingua madre tedesca e, lungi dal violare, realizza il principio di eguaglianza». The Court does not articulate why precisely such a system makes equal treatment more effective: the reason presumably is that an administrative service in which only part of the personnel is bilingual might offer only a second-rate service to one of the language groups.

[148] See S. O'Ciosain, «Bilingualism in Public Administration - The Case of Ireland», in Revista de Llengua t Dret, n. 2, 1983, 11-19, at 13.

[149] Henchy J. in The State (Cussen) v Brennan, in Irish Reports, 1981, 181, at 194,

[150] Arts. 43 of the Law on Language Use in Administrative Matters (coordinated version); see the analysis of this regime in C. Wilwerth, op. cit., at 15 ff. A different regime applies for the local administrations in the Brussels area. There, according to art, 21.7 of the same law, half of the newly recruited personnel must be chosen on a fifty-fifty basis among the French and Dutch language group (so that the Dutch-speakers have a guaranteed proportion of 25 %); in addition, all the highest levels of the hierarchy had to be staffed by equal numbers of French —and Dutch— speakers by the year 1973. On the partial antinomy between those two provisions, and the difficulties in implementing them, see C. Wilwerth, op. cit., at 71-85.

[151] The principle is stated, with regard to the State administrative offices within the province, by art. 89 of the Regional Statute: «Per la provincia di Bolzano sono instituiti ruoli del personale civile (...). I posti dei ruoli (...) sono riservati a cittadini appartenenti a ciascuno dei tre gruppi linguistici, in rapporto alla consistenza dei gruppi stessi, quale risulta dalle dichiarazioni di apartenenza rese nel censimento ufficiale della popolazione». But the same principle also holds for the regional, provincial and local administration operating within the Bolzano province. See the details in A. Pizzorusso, Il pluralismo linguistico tra Stato nazionale e autonomie regiondi, Pisa, Pacini editore, 1975, at 85 ff,

[152] The last available official statistics on language use are from 1947. Since then, the language question has been omitted from the population census for political reasons: the Flemings feared that a number of persons (especially in the area around Brussels) might falsely declare to be French-speakers because of the greater social prestige attached to that language, and thereby provoke a modification of the linguistic regime of some localities at the linguistic 'border'. See M. G. Levy, «Le recensement linguistique du 1 Janvier 1960 ou naissance, vie et mort d'un recensements, in Res Publica 1959, 58 ff.

[153] This does not mean that the census acts as a neutral and reliable indicator of the linguistic composition of the population. The most recent 1981 census allegedly gave a false picture, because concrete benefits depended on one's individual language declaration: as there are generally less German-speaking candidates for the civil service jobs attributed to their group, bilinguals or Italian-speakers might have been tempted to declare themselves as German-speakers in order to stand better chances for public employment. See P. Carrozza, «La dichiarazione di appartenenza ai gruppi linguistici nella provincia di Bolzano», in he Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 1983, 1137-1157, at 1150-1151.

[154] H. Laquieze, «Italie:Statut d'autonomie et rapports culturels intercommunau-taires dans la Region Trentino-Sud-Tirol», in Y. Mény & B. De Witte eds), Centres et periphéries. Le portage du pouvoir, Paris, Economics, 1983, 149-179, at 169.

[155] See R. Ingicco, «Censimento e dichiarazione di appartcnenza linguistica in Alto Adige - Sudtirol», in Notiziario Giuridico Regionale, 1982, 130-143, at 137.

[156] Presidential Decree of 22 October 1981.

[157] See e.g. the judgments n. 3372 of 5 May 1954, Hoebanckx c. Etat beige, in Recueil des Arrts el Avis du Conseil d'Elat, 1954, 444; and n. 12924-12926 of 26 April 1968, Simoens, Mourlon-Beernaert, De Witte c. Office national d'allocations familiales pour travailleurs salaries, in Id., 1968, 294. In writing, see e.g. L. Ingber, «A propos de l'egalité dans la jurisprudence belge», in L'egaliti, I, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1971, 3-35, at 17-19.

[158] The indirect link between linguistic membership and the objective needs of the service is articulated by art. 43.3 of the Belgian Law: «Le Roi détermine pour chaque service central le nombre des emplois à attribuer au cadre francais et au cadre néerlandais, en tenant compte, à tous les degres de la hie'rarchie, de l'importance que représentent respectivement pour chaque service de la region de langue française et la region de langue ne'erlandaise». A similar practice —but without any hard rules— seems to be followed in the Swiss central administration. See e.g. P. Schaeppi, Der Schutz sprachlicher und konfessionneller Minderheiten im Recht von Bund und Kantonen, Zuerich, Schulthess, 1971, at 71.

[159] A. Pizzorusso, Il pluralismo linguistica..., op. cit., at 84-85. In Belgium, this type of reasoning is not only used to justify the proportional recruitment of civil servants on the basis of language groups but also on the basis of political opinion. The Council of State has consistently held that a proportional recruitment of adherents to the various political 'ideologies' gives better guarantees of administrative impartiality than a system based on a forced belief in the neutrality of every single civil servant. In my opinion, the objective reasons which might justify the linguistic criterion do not exist in the case of the 'ideological' criterion (one is necessarily a member of a language group, but one should not be forced to profess a political opinion in order to gain access to public administration). See, for an analysis and mild critique of the regime, J. De Meyer, «Levensbeschouwelijk en politiek pluralisme in openbare diensten», in Miscellanea W, J. Gansbof van der Meersch, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1972, Vol. III, 79-94.

[160] In Hernandez v Texas (347 U.S. 475 (1954)), the Supreme Court held that «it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws to try a defendant of a particular race or color under an indictment issued by a grand jury (...) from which all persons of his race or color have because of that race been excluded by the State». In the more recent case Castaneda v Partida (430 U.S. 482 (1977), the Supreme Court extended its holding to substantial underrepresentation of such minority groups that constitute a recognizable, distinct class (as the Mexican-Americans do). A statistical showing that their group is underrepresented in the jury amounts to a presumption of a discriminatory purpose of the selectors (Id., at 494).

[161] Denying the existence of a direct horizontal effect of fundamental rights, and of the right to equality in particular: T. Koopmans, «Comparative Analysis and Evaluation», in Koopmans (ed), The Constitutional Protection of Equality, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1975,at227ff.;K. Hesse,Grundzuege des Verfassungsrecbts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Heidelberg, C. F. Mueller, 1982, 13th ed, at 139; E. Klein, op. tit., at 91-92; Italian Court of Cassation, judgment of 11 November 1976, in Il Foro Italiano, 1977, I, 403404; A. S. Agro, op. cit., at Z30; E. Alonso García, «E1 principio de igualdad del Artículo 14 de la Constitución española», in Revista de Administración Publica, n. 100-102, 1983, 21-92, at 86 ff. For comparative discussions of this subject, see M. J. Horan, «Contemporary Constitutionalism and Legal Relationships between Individuals», in International and Comparative Low Quarterly, 1976, 848-867; and the contributions in Reni Cassin Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber III, La protection des droits de l'homme dans les rapports entre personnes privies, Paris, Pedone, 1971.

[162] For a recent, comprehensive presentation in legal writing, see M. Chamallas, «Evolving Conceptions of Equality under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle», in UCLA Law Review, 1983, 305-383.

[163] See L. Lustgarten, Legal Control of Racial Discrimination, London, Macmillan, 1980; M. J. Beloff, Sex Discrimination - the New Law, London, Butterworths, 1976.

[164] See L. Angiello, La parità di trattamento net rapporti di lavoro, Milano, Giuffrè, 1979; R. Panzarini, «Gli atti discriminatori nel rapporto di lavoro», in Il Diritto del Lavoro, 1980, 841.

[165] See e.g. R. A. Eich, «Das Gesetz ueber die Gleichbehandlung von Maennern und Frauen am Arbeitsplatz», in Neue Juristische Wochensckrift, 1980, 2331 ff.

[166] See e.g. the analysis by J. Hoens, «De strafrechtelijke bestrijding van rassen-discriminatic», in Ars Aequi, 1981, 547-557.

[167] See J. Costa-Lascoux, «La loi du 1 juillet 1972 et la protection penale des immigres contre la discrimination raciale», in Droit Social, 1976, mai, 181-187.

[168] The Civil Rights Act, although primarily intended for the protection of racial minorities and women, also forbids 'national origin' discrimination. The term was defined by the Supreme Court as referring «to the country where a person was born or, more broadly, the country from -which his or her ancestors came» (Espinoza v Farah Mfg. Co, 414 U.S. 86 (1973), at 88). Thus, a bias towards English, in situations where it is not required by the task to be performed, can often be a discrimination based on national origin; for an exhaustive analysis of case law on this point, see Note, «Language Discrimination under Title VII: The Silent Right of National Origin Discriminations, in John Marshall Law Review, 1982, 667-691, at 679 ff. It should be noted that in Title VII cases, in contrast with constitutional equality litigation, no direct proof of discriminatory intent has to be made; if the plaintiff can show that a 'neutral' practice has a disparate impact on one of the protected groups, there is a prima facie case of indirect discrimination, which then has to be balanced against the 'business necessity' of the practice (Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)). See, on this latter concept, Comment, «The Business Necessity Defense to Disparats Impact Liability under Title VII», in University of Chicago Law Review, 1979, 911-934.

[169] In legal writing, see e.g. L. Lustgarten, op. cit.,\ see also the case law of the European Court of Justice, infra, p. 610.

[170] Article 119 of the E.E.C. Treaty guarantees equal pay for men and women; art. 2.1 (d) of the 1965 Convention against Racial Discrimination holds that aeach State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization».

[171] A. H. LEIBOWITZ,«English Literacy:Legal Sanction for Discrimination», in Notre Dame Lawyer, 1969, 7-67, at 7.

[172] Lassiter v Northampton County (North Carolina) Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). In this case, the Court considered the relevance of literacy tests in general, but entirely neglected the question whether English literacy tests could be discriminatory against the country's linguistic minorities (in the concrete case, only blacks were concerned).

[173] Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of an exemption from the English literacy test, which had been federally imposed in favour of the Puertoricans, and was not asked to decide whether such tests were constitutional in all remaining cases. Nevertheless, Brennan J. wrote some interesting dicta in his opinion for the Court: «Congress might have also questioned whether denial of a right deemed so precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary and appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English, or of furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise. Finally, Congress might well have, concluded that as a means of furthering the intelligent exercise of the franchise, an ability to read or understand Spanish is as effective as an ability to read English for those to whom Spanish-language newspapers and Spanish-language radio ante television programs are available to inform them of election issues and governmental affairs.»

[174] Castro v State of California, 85 California Reporter 20 (1970). That English literacy tests are now clearly illegitimate is further proven by the federal provisions on bilingual elections: far from requiring English literacy, the electoral procedure is now specially adapted to the needs of the non-English-speaking... (see infra, p. 109).

[175] Law n. 73.42 of 9 January 1973, art. 69. The knowledge of French is to be verified by an administrative body (see implementing Decree of 10 July 1973, art. 31).

[176] J. H. Garvey, «Freedom and Equality in the Religion Clausess, in The Supreme Court Review, 1981, 193-221, at 209, note 67.

[177] See the Staatscourant of 3 October 1974, and of 12 May 1975, For a description of the aids system, see A Van Der Feltz & R. Zeldenrust, «Een liaison met gemengde gevoelens», in Ars Aequi, 1983, 20-34.

[178] See the Royal Decree of 14 November 1978, art.1: of the total fund, 6 % goes to the national press agency Belga, 4 % to the German language dailies (of which there is only one, 'Grenz Echo'), and 45 % to both the French —and Dutch— language dailies. Thereby, the French-speaking press gets more than its share of the total population, but less than its share in newspaper circulation, while the German minority is advantaged on both scores. On this regime, see F. Delperee, «Present et subventions», in Mélanges Fernand Debousse, Paris, F. Nathan & Bruxelles, Labor, 1979, vol. 1, 183-192.

[179] The principle of non-discrimination, so the argument goes, is practically worthless, because it does not meet the central demand of linguistic minorities: to be protected against assimilation by the dominant language group. See e.g. A. Demichel, «L'eVolution de la protection des minoritds depuis 1945», in Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 1960, 22-51, at 35; F. Muench, «Volks-gruppenrecht und Menschenrechte», in System eines internationalen Volksgruppenrechts, Wien, Wilh. Braumueller, Vol. I, 1970, 55-104, at 102: «Insbesondere ist det Gleichheitssatz, so wie er heute verstanden wird, noch nicht geeignet, ein Volksgruppenrecht dort einzufuehren, wo es nicht besteht. Gewiss ist er ein wesentlicher Schutz fuer den Angehoerigen der Volksgruppen, weil er eine Diskriminierung verbietet; aber dessen besonderen Belangen als Volksgruppenanghorigen genuegt er nicht». See also the discussion supra, p. 43-44.

[180] T. Koopmans, «Comparative Analysis and Evaluation», in Koopmans (ed), The Constitutional Protection of Equality, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1975, 213-255 at 249.

[181] A, Mandelstam, «La protection des minoritess», in Recueil des Cours, 1923, 367-517, at 418: «Dans un certain nombre de cas, regalité accordée aux membres des mino rités se manifeste non pat l'octroi de droits identiques a ceux de la majorité, mais par la concession de droits analogues - tel le droit de ptofesser une religion ou celui de se servir d'une langue, distinctes de eelles de la majorité». See also Claydon, «Interna-tionally Uprooted People and the Transnational Protection fo Minority Cultures», in New York Law Review, 1978, 125-151, at 135: «Equality is effectuated and not undermined by protecting minority cultures, for what is involved is simple equality in the cultural sphere». See also the Albanian Minority Schools judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in which the Court distinguishes two aspects in the notion of equality as used in the context of the minority treaties: «The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect equality with the other nationals of the State. The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics. These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions, and were consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being a minority» (Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J, (1935), Series A/B, No. 64, at 17).

[182] «La Repubblica tutela le minoranze linguistiche con apposite misure».

[183] C. Esposito, «Eguaglianza e giustizia nell'att, 3 della costituzione», in La Costituzione italiana. Saggi, Padova, CEDAM, 1954, at 49; P. Biscaretti di Ruffia, «Uguaglianza (prineipio di)», in Novissimo Digesto Italiano, XIX, Torino, UTET, 1973, 1088-1092, at 1091.

[184] See above, the note 81 at p. 64.

[185] My translation.

[186] «L'art. 3, 2. comma, e le sue specificationi (...) pongono come scope dell'attività dei pubblici poteri, non soltanto l'abolizione delle discriminazioni sfavorevoli, ma anche la realizzazione in positivo di interventi diretti a correggere le dseguaglianze di fatto derivanti dalle ingiustizie del passato o anche da cause puramente naturali» (A. Pizzo-russo, Lezioni di diritto costituziortale, Roma, Edicioni de 'II Foro Italiano', 1981 (2nd ed), at 154). To the extent that the first sentence of art. 3 also implies a need to treat different things differentily, there is a certain overlapping between both sentences; see B. Caravita, «L'art. 3, comma 2, nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale», in Giurisprudenza costituzionde, 1983, 2359-2383, at 2367 ti.

[187] See the list of those specifications in A. Pizzorusso, Lezioni..., op. cit., at 162.

[188] See also the demonstration of this thesis in A. Pizzorusso, II pluralismo linguistico..., op. cit., at 36-42.

[189] A. Pizzorusso, op. ult. cit,, at 28.

[190] M.Udina,«SulI'attuazione dell'art.6 dellaCostituzione per latutela delle minoranze linguistiche», in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale,1974,3602-3613,at3609; A. Pizzorusso, «Problemi giuridici dell'uso delle lingue in Italia (con patticolare riferimento alla situazione delle minoranze linguistiche non riconosciute)», in Le Regioni, 1977, 1031-1039, at 1035; S. Salvi, Le lingue tagliate, Milano, Rizzoli, 1975, at 9 ff.; A. Pubusa, «Considerazioni sulla tutela della lingua in Sardegna», in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico, 1983, 552-539, at 570-571.

[191] A. Pizzorusso, loc. ult. cit.

[192] See the discussion in G. Francescato, «A Sociolinguistic Survey of Friulian as a 'Minor Language's, in Linguistics 1976, 97-121, at 101 ff.; D. Bonamore, «Autonomia, lingua e diritti scolastici per il Friuli e il Friulano», in Rivista Giuridica della Scuota, 1982, 833-847, at 837 ff.

[193] A. Pubusa, op. cit., at 571 (note 34) and 578 ff.; see alsoL. Sole, «La Sardegna come minoranza etnico-Linguisticaa, in Citta e Regione, 1980, n. 3, 132-148, at 143 ff.

[194] . The central government traditionally interpreted art. 6 as making of the 'protection of linguistic minorities' a separate policy matter which, in the absence of any explicit attribution to the Regions, is reserved for the central State. This view is rejected by most authors, who conclude from the location of article 6 (among the general principles of the Constitution) and from the use of the word 'Republic' (considered as embracing both the State and the Regions), that the directive to protect linguistic minorities is addressed to all public authorities within their respective sphrere of competences (see e.g. A. Pizzorusso, «Tutela delle minoranze linguistiche e competenza legislativa regionale», in Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 1974, 1093-1102). For an analysis of the role which regional autonomy has effectively played in the protection of Italy's minority cultures, see A. Pizzorusso, «L'activite' des regions italiennes pour le developpement et la defense des cultures locales», in Y, Mény & B. De Witte (eds), Dix arts de rigiondisation en Europe. Bilan et perspectives 1970-1980, Paris, Cujas, 1982, 243-263.

[195] . For a general picture of the smaller linguistic minorities in South Italy, see J. U. Clau:: & B. De Witte, «Linguistic Minorities in Southern Italiy: A. Periphery far from the Borders, in B. De Marchi &. A. M. Boileau (eds), Boundaries and Minorities in Western Europe, Milano, Franco Angeli Editore, 1982, 229-244.

[196] . See R. Ingicco, «Minoranze linguistiche:due iniziative regionali rinviate dal governoa, in Le Regioni, 1977, 971-976.

[197] . Veneto Regional Laws of 1 August 1974, n. 40, and 18 May 1979, n. 38; Piedmont Regional Law of 20 June 1979, n. 30. See the comments by R. Ingicco, «La legge regionale piemontese sulla tutela del patrimonio linguistico e culturales, in Le Regioni, 1980, 7-10; and P. Carrozza, «Lingue (uso delle)», in Novissimo Dtgesto Italiano, Appendice IV, Torino, UTET, 1983, 976-988, at 987.

[198] . The power for the Regional Councils to submit Bills of national statutes to the Parliament is provided in art. 121 of the Constitution,

[199] . For an analysis of the Sardinian draft, see A. PubuSA, op. cit. On the scarce possibilities of enactment of the Bill, also due to internal contrasts within Sardinian political circles, see A. Pubusa, op. cit,, at 568 ff., and P. Carrozza, «Minoranze linguistiche», in Annuario delle autonomie locali, 1982, 391-401, at 396.

[200] . Sicilian Regional Law of 6 May 1981, n. 85.

[201] . See the recent judgment of 18 October 1983 (concerning a law enacted by the Province of Bolzano), in Le Regioni, 1984, 238 (with note by A. Pizzorusso).

[202] . Isolated communities speaking German dialects are to be found in the provinces of Belluno, Udine, Verona, Vicenza, Novara, Vercelli, and Aosta (see T. De Mauro, «Note sulle minoranze linguistiche e nazionali in Italia», in Il Mulino, 1979, 349-367, at 356-357);a limited number of Franco-Provencal speakers live in Piedmontese valleys neighbouring to the Aosta Valley (Id., at 361).

[203] . For an overview of the legal protection of the Ladin minority, see A. Pizzo-Russo, Il pluralismo linguistico, op. cit., at 215-228; E. Palici di Suni, «La minoranza linguistica ladina in Trentino-Alto Adige», in Le Regioni, 1983, 527-538.

[204] . An Act of 1961 established schools in which Slovene is the exclusive medium of instruction at all grades; it codified the existing situation which had been initiated after the war by the Allied Military Government in the two provinces of Trieste and Gorizia which it controlled. For a detailed analysis of the legal regime of these schools, see D. Bonamore, Discipline giuridica delle istituzioni scolastiche a Trieste e Gorizia, Milano, Giuffre, 1979.

[205] . On the interplay between those two instruments, see S. Bartole, «Tutela della minoranza linguistics slovena ed esecuzione del Trattato di Osimo», in Rivista di diritto internazionale 1977, 507-525.

[206] . See the Act mentioned in note 110, above.

[207] . For a general survey of the present regime of protection of the Slovene minority, see S. Bartole, «La tutela del gruppo linguistico sloveno tra legislazione e amministrazione», in Città e Regions, 1980, n. 3, 58-71.

[208] . Various bills for the global protection of the Slovene language group have been pending for years before Parliament.

[209] . In contrast with the fifteen so-called 'ordinary Regions', the five 'special statute Regions' (Trentino-Alto-Adige, South Tyrol, Sicily, Sardinia, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia) have had their Statute adopted, not by an ordinary law of the national parliament but by a 'constitutional law' (ranking immediately beneath the Constitutions itself).

[210] . A. Pizzorusso, II pluralismo linguistico..., op. cit., at 278.

[211] . See above, p. 79.

[212] . Therefore, it did not have supremacy over subsequent nations] legislation. See the Constitutional Court judgment of 18 May 1960, rejecting a challenge based on the terms of the Agreement against national legislation applying to the Region (in Giurisprudenza Costituxionale, 1960, 537, at 555); see also the case note by C, Mortati, «Influenza delle convenzioni internazionali in ordine alla tutela dell'uso della lingua tedesca nella Provinzia di Bolzano», Ibid.; and A, Pizzorusso, «Aspetti dell'efficacia giuridica dell'accordo Degasperi-Gruber», in A 30 anni della firma del Patti Degasperi-Gruber, 5 sett. 1946. L'accordo di Parigi, Trento, Regione Ttentino Alto Adige, 1976, 137-148.

[213] . The present Statute is contained in the Presidential Decree of 31 August 1972 ('Testo unico delle leggi costituzionali concernenti lo statuto speciale per il Trentino-Alto Adige'), coordinating the original Statute with the amendments enacted by the Constitutional Law of 10 November 1971, n. 1.

[214] . «Nella regione e riconosciuta parita di diritti ai cittadini, qualunque sia il gruppo linguistico al quale appartengono, e sono salveguardate le rispettive caratteristiche etniche e culturali».

[215] . However, the rights granted in the new Statute have only very slowly been implemented, Thus, the right to use German before the courts of the Region, guaranteed by art. 100 of the Statute, has still to be implemented in practice (a draft regulation has however been recently adopted; see a first (critical) comment by A. Pasquali, «Uso della lingua davanti agli organi giudiziari nella provincia di Bolzano», in II Foro Italiano, 1984, V. 379-382).

[216] . Art. 19.2 of the Special Statute guarantees the teaching in Ladin in nursery schools, and the teaching of Ladin in the primary schools of the province of Bolzano. In addition, one should mention art. 102 of the Statute: «Le popolazioni ladine hanno diritto alla valorizzazione delle proptie iniziative ed attivita culturali, di stampa e ricreative, nonche al rispetto delta toponomastica e delle tradizioni delle popolazioni stesse (...)».

[217] . «Piu forte era ed ft la forza di attrazione economica, politics, cultutale degli Stati al di la dei confini, maggiore è la quantita e qualita di tutela accordata dalla Repubblica italiana a coloro che vivendo in Italia ne avvertono —e fanno pesare sul tavolo delle richieste e delle trattative— il richiamo» (D. Bonamqre, op. tit., at 837).

[218] . Private Bills n. 107 of 20 June 1979 (Radical Party), n. 2068 of 24 October 1980 (Socialist Party), n. 2318 of 4 February 1981 (Communist Party). See, on these proposals, P. Carrozza, «Minoranze linguistiche», in Guide per le autonomie locali, 1982, at 393 ff., and Id., in id., 1983, at 404 ff.

[219] . Cf. supra, p. 62 ff.

[220] . Judgment of 28 December 1970, n. 192, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1970, 2203 (on a recourse by the President of the Region Trentino-Alto Adige).

[221] . Law of 11 March 1970, art. 10.

[222] . Id., at 2209-2210: «Pacifico infine e soprattuto, che 1'art. 2 dello Statuto, pres-crivendo la salvaguardia delle caratteristiche etniche e cultural! dei gruppi linquistici coesistenti nella Regione, si oppone a misure rivolti a detcrminare forzate assimilazioni tra di essi o suscettibili di comprometterne il libero sviluppo, secondo le rispettive tradizioni e costumanze».

[223] . Law of 29 April 1949, art. 11, n. 6, exempting ftom the obligation of recruitment the small agricultura enterprises (less than 6 workers) in 'mixed language zones'».

[224] . Article 2 of the Statute is «sistematicamente inquadrato nel piu generals principio di tutela delle minoranze linguistiche affermalo nell'art. 6 Cost.».

[225] . Judgment of 11 February 1982, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1982, I, 247. There are a number of comments on this case: P. Carrozza, «I1 prudente atteggiamento della corte in tema di 'garanzte linguistiche' nel processo e le sue conseguenze sulk condizione giuridica della minoranza slovena», in I1 Foro Italiano, 1982, I, 1815-1825; G. Tiberini,«La protezione dellaminoranza slovenaa Trieste», in Id.,1825-1829; S. Bartole, «GIi sloveni nel processo penale a Trieste», in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1982, I, 249-259; E. Palici di Suni, «Corte costituzionale e minoranze linguistiche: la sent. a. 28 del 1982 tra tradizione e innovazione», in Id., 808-825; G. Mor, «L'uso ufficiale della lingua di una 'minoranza riconosciuta': il caso della minoranza slovena», in Le Regioni, 1982, 389-400; V. Marchiano, «Uso delle lingue nei procedimenti giudiziari e principi costituzionali», in Giurisprudenza Italiana, 1982, I, 1387-1396.

[226] .Judgement of 9 July 1963, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1965, 1603. In his case comment, Paladin approves the Court's decision and puts great emphasis on the 'programmatic' nature of art. 6:«non e dell'att. 6 che vanno ricavati i criteri per la valutazione della legittimità delle norme sull'uso della lingua italiana; ed è insostenibile che, difettando l'apposita tutela delle minoranze, disposizioni generali sul tipo dell'art. 122, siano da considerare incostituzionali ed inapplicabili, limitatamente ai soli territori mistilinguiw (L, Paladin, «Sulla legittimità delle norme processuali in tema di uso esclusivo della lingua italiana», Id., at 1607).

[227] . Judgment of 11 February 1982, cit., at 255.

[228] . Id., at 256-257. On the educational measures, see supra, note 110; on the regime for the elections to the European Parliament, infra, p. 124; as for broadcasting, the reference is to the law on the national broadcasting service which imposes the transmission of radio and television programmes in German and Ladin (South Tyrol), French (Val d'Aosta), and Slovene (Trieste) (Law of 14 April 1975, art. 19. c).

[229] . Id., at 257: «Se ormai si e in presenza, al di là di ogni dubbio, di una 'minoranza riconosciuta', con tale situazione è incompatibile, prima ancora logicamente che giuridicamente, qualsiasi sanzione che colpisca l'uso della lingua materna da parte degli appartenenti alla minoranza stessa».

[230] . Favouring such a wide interpretation, G. Mor, «L'uso ufficiale...», op. cit., at 400; E. Palici di Suni, «Corte constituzionale e minoranze linguistiche...», op. cit., at 823. More cautious, S. Bartole, «Gli sloveni nel processes penale...», op. cit., at 257.

[231] . Judgment of 11 February 1982, cit., at 259.

[232] . See G. Mor, op. ult. cit., at 396:«Ciò non esclude che laddove esiste un gruppo minoritario non riconosciuto singole disposizioni di legge potrebbero essere dichiarate incostituzionali se perseguono un risultato opposto rispetto a quello fatto proprio dalla Costituzione, portano cioè alla distruzione, anziché alla tutela del gruppo».

[233] . As is also argued by A. Milian Massana, «La regulación constitucional del multilinguismo», in Revista Española de Derecho Constitueional, n. 10, 1984, 123-154, p. 146, at note 63.

[234] . R. Entrena Cuesta, «Art. 3», in F. Garrido Falla (ed), Comentarios a la constitucidn, Madrid, Ed. Civitas, 1980, 50-59, at 57.

[235] . See, in this sense, R. Entrena Cuesta, op. cit., at 58 («en perfecta consonancia con el articulo 9.2») and A. MILIAN Massana, op. cit., at 145-146: «E1 artículo 3.3 no serfa mas que una concreci6n en el campo idiomatico del principio de igualdad sustancial genéricamente incorporado por la Constitución en el articulo 9.2 al requerir a los poderes publicos que remuevan los obstaculos que impidan o dificultan que la libertad y la igualdad del individuo y de los grupos en que se integra sean reales y efectivas».

[236] . The following Statutes contain provisions proclaiming the co-officiality of Castillian and the respective regional language:the Basque Statute (art. 6.1 - Basque ('Euskera'); the Catalan Statute (art. 3.2 - Catalan); the Galician Statute (art. 52 - Galician);the Statute of the Valencian Community (art. 7.1 - 'Valenciano', i.e. Catalan); the Navarra Statute (art. 9.2 - Basque ('Vascuence')); the Statute of the Balearic islands (art. 3 - Catalan). For an overview of the statutory provisions on language use, see A. Milian Massana, «La ordenación estatutaria de las lenguas distintas al castellano», in Revista Vasca de Administration Pública, 1983, n. 6, 237-246.

[237] . In Spain, the regulation of language use seems to be considered as an ancillary matter, which is to be exercised both by the State and the Communities, each within its own jurisdiction (see A. Milian Massana, «La regulación...», op. cit., at note 58).

[238] . In Euzkadi, the Law of 24 November 1982, n. 10, «Ley básica de normalización del uso del Euskera»; in Catalonia, the Law of 18 April 1983, n. 7, «Ley de normalization lingüísticas; in Galicia, the Law of 15 June 1983, n. 3, «Ley de normalization linguistica»; in the Valencian Community, the Law of 23 November 1983, n. 4, «Ley de uso y enseñanza del valenciano». Those Acts cover all the domains of public language use falling within the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Communities. They are in the process of being supplemented, in their turn, by Decrees specifying the regime of specific fields (education, administration, etc.); see the survey by A. MlLIAN Massana, «Notes de legislació i jurisprudèncias, in Revista de Llengua i Dret, 1984, n. 3, 135-155.

[239] . Amparo,the direct individual recourse to the Constitutional Tribunal, can only be based on those articles of the Constitution dealing directly with fundamental rights, and not on article 3.

[240] . Bable is protected by art. 4 of the Asturian Statute: «E1 bable gozara de protección. Se promovera su uso, su difusión en los medios de comunicacón y su ensenanza, respetando, en todo caso, las variantes locales y voluntariedad en su aprendizaje». Arams (an Occitan dialect) is mentioned by art. 3.4 of the Catalan Statute: «E1 habla aranesa sera objeto de ensenanza y de especial respeto y proteccion ». Art. 7 of the Aragon Statute, finally, holds that «Las diversas modalidades lingüísticas de Aragdn gozarán de protección, como elementos integrantes de su patrimonio cultural y histórico». On the legal regime of those various languages, see the following comments: X. X. SAnchez Vicente, «La lengua asturiana y el estatuto de autonomía», in Las Lenguas Na-donates en la Administration, Valencia, Diputaci6n Provincial, 1981, 189-197; X. Lamuela, «Política lingüística a la Vall d'Aran: les regies del joc», in Revista de Llengua i Dret, 1984, n. 3, 59-64; F. Nagore Lain, «Notas sobre el uso administrativo del Aragonés», in Revista de llengua i Dret, 1983, n. 2, 97-110; A. Quintana, «E1 marc legal del català a l'Aragó», in Id., 141-145.

[241] . «Alle Volksstaemme des Staates sind gleichberechtigt, und jeder Volksstamm hat ein unverletzliches Rech auf Wahrung und Pflege seiner Nationalitaet und Sprache. Die Gleichberechtigung aller landesueblichen Sprachen in Schule, Amt und oeffentlichem Leben wird vom Staat anerkannt. In den Laendern, in welchen mehrere Volksstaemme wohnen, sollen die oeffentlichen Unterrichtsanstalten derart eingerichtet sein, dass ohne Anwendung eines Zwanges zur ErJernung einer zweiten Landessprache jeder dieser Volksstaemme die erforderlichen Mittel zur Ausbildung in seiner Sprache erhaelt». For a quick overview of the rich case law on this article in pre-1914 Austria, see E. Melichar, «Die Freiheitsrechte der Dezember-Verfassung 1867 und ihre Entwicklung in der reichsgerichtlichen Judikatur», in Oesterrecbische Zeitscbrift fuer Oeffentliches Recht 1966, at 283-288.

[242] . Judgements n. 2459/1952, 3509/1959 and 4221/1962.

[243] . See e.g. F. Ermacora, Handbuch der Grundfreiheiten und Menschenrechten, Ein Kommentar zu den oesterreicbiscben Grundrechtsbestimmungen, Wien, Manz, 1963, at 531-532.

[244] . P. PernThaler & F. Esterbauer, «Moeglichkeiten des rechtlichen Volksgruppenschutzess, in System eines internationalen Volksgruppenrechts, Vol. 2, Wien, Wilh. Braumueller, 1972, 175-188, at 175. This is also the interpretation given to this clause by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Albanian Minority Schools case, quoted supra, in note 87.

[245] . Article 7.3 of the Vienna State Treaty holds that:«In the Administrative and judicial districts of Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria, where there ate Slovene, Croat or mixed populations, the Slovene or Croat language shall be accepted as an official language in addition to Germans, On this provision, see the recent judgment by the Austrian Constitutional Court of 28 June 1983, in Europaeische Grundrechte Zeilschrift 1984, at 20.

[246] . Judgment of 5 October 1981, in Europaeische Grundrecbte Zeitschrift, 1982, Wertentscheidung des Verfassungsgesetzgebers zugunsten des Minderheitenschutzes enthalten».

[247] . Ibid.: «Eine mehr oder minder schematische Gleichstellung von Angehoerigen der Minderheiten mit Angehoerigen anderer gesellschaftlcher Gruppen wird der verfas-sungsgesetzlichen Wertentscheidung nicht immer genuegen koennen. Je nach dem Regelungsgegenstand kann es der Schutz von Angehoerigen einer Minderheit gegenueber Angehoerigen anderer gesellschaftlicher Gruppen sachlich rechtfertigen oder sogar erfordern, die Minderheit in gewissen Belangen zu bevorzuegen». In the present case, the court estimated however that there was no constitutional claim to a special treatment; but then, the claim was one of affirmative equality and not of pluralistic equality; see further, p. 122-123.

[248] . T. Modeen, «The Situation of the Finland-Swedish Population in the Light of International, Constitutional and Administrative Laws, in Mc Gill Law Journal, 1970, 121-139 at 128.

[249] . T. Modeen, loc. cit.: «Article 14 of the Constitution Act is an expression of the principle of equality that should exist between citizens of different population groups which the state has recognised as being of equal standings». That art. 14 can be considered as an embodiment of equality is further borne out by the text of the article: after stating the principle of co-officiality, art. 14 goes on in a second paragraph: «The cultural and economic needs of the Finnish-speaking and the Swedish-speaking populations shall be met by the State in accordance with the principle of equality». On this clause, see infra, p. 118.

[250] . Case 'relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium', judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 23 July 1968, in Publications of the European Court of Human rights, Series A (unnumbered). Among the many comments on this decision, see J. Verhoeven, «L'arrêt du 23 juillet 1968 dans l'affaire relative a certains aspects aspects du regime linguistique de l'enseignement en Belgique», in Revue Beige de Droit International 1970, 353-382; L. Wildhaber, «Der Belgische Sprachenstreit vor dem europaeischen Gerichtshof fuer Menschenrechte», in Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 1969-1970, 15-38; B. De Witte, The Protection of Linguistic diversity..., op. cit., 569-594.

[251] . Judgment of 17 May 1983, in Bundesverfassungsentscbeidungen, 64, 135, at 157: «Zum Ausgleich sprachbedingter Erschwernisse, die im Tatsaechlichen auftreten, verp-flichtet das Diskriminierungsverbot des Art. 3 Abs. 3 GG nicht».

[252] . Cf. supra, p. 65.

[253] . For some world-wide comparative data, see Study of Equality in the Administration of Justice, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/296/Rev. 1 (1972), at paras. 410-418 and 431-442.

[254] . The linguistic implications of the constitutional right to a fair trial are spelled out e.g. in the German Constitutional Court judgment of 17 May 1983, at 145: «Das Rechtauf ein rechtsstaatlicb.es, faires Strafverfahren verbietet es, den der deutschen Sprache nicht oder nicht hinreichend maechtigen Angeklagten zu einem unverstandenen Objekt des Verfahrens herabzuwuerdigen; er muss in die Lage versetzt wetden, die ihn betreffenden wesentlichen Verfahrensvorgaenge verstehen und sich im Verfahren verstaend-lich machen zu koennen». In the United States, a number of lower court decisions have increasingly recognised that the right to an interpreter is indirectly contained in the general right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clauses of the 14th Amendment, as well as in the more specific fair trial rights of the 6th Amendment. See, above all, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Negron v New York, 434 F. 2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970). For a comment on this and other decisions, see Note, «Non-English-speaking Persons in the Criminal Justice System: Current State of the Laws, in Cornell Law Review, 1976, 289-311.

[255] . In the articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, one finds three references to the use of languages in criminal proceedings. Article 5.2 deals with the time of arrest: «Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him». Article 6, for its part, deals with criminal proceedings in the strict sense. According to art. 6.3, «Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly in a language which he understands and in detail, of the accusation against him; (...) (c) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in the courts. This latter provision has been interpreted in more detail by the European Human Rights Court in the case of Luedicke, Belkacem and Koc, judgment of 28 November 1978, in Publications of the European Court of Human rights, Series A, n. 28.

[256] . Lau v Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See the following discussions of the issues raised by this case, and of subsequent developments: S. D. Sugarman &. E. G. ceiDESS, «Equal Protection for Non-English-speaking School - children: Lau v. Nichols», in California Law Review, 1974, 157-183; W. E. Johnson, «The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity», in Southern California Law Review, 1974, 943-997; K. Fong, «Cultural Pluralisms, in Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, 1978, 133-173; P. D. Roos, «Bilingual Education: Opportunity, in Law and Contemporary Problems, 1978, 111-140; Comment, «Bilingual Education and Desegregations, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1979, 15644606; S. Robenbaum, «Educating Children of Immigrant Workers: Language Policies in France & the USA», in American Journal of Comparative Law, 1981, 429-465, at 439 ff.; Note, «Assuring Equal Opportunity for Language-Minority Students», in Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, 1983, 209-293; R. C. Farrell, «Bilingual Education: The Extent to an Entitlement», in George Mason University Law Review, 1983, 69-110; Note, «Supplemental Language Instruction for Students with Limited English-Speaking Ability: The Relationship between the Right and the Remedy», in Washington University Law Quarterly, 1983, 415-434; Proposal, «(Bilingual Education Guidelines for the Courts and the Schools», in Emory Law Journal 1984, 577-629.

[257] . Lau v Nichols, cit., respectively at 566 and 568.

[258] . Guidelines of 1970, 35 Federal Register 11595, quoted in Lau v Nichols, cit., at 568.

[259] . Note that the structural difference between these alternative remedies does not automatically imply also a functional difference. The objective of bilingual education can indeed be, like that of special English courses, to promote the assimilation of the minorities in the English mainstream.

[260] . See e.g. the following cases: Serna v Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F. 2d 1147 (10th Circ. 1974); Cintron v Brentwood Union Free School District, 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.OJV.Y. 1978); Rios v Reed, 480 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).

[261] . On the prevalence of the intent standard in American equality doctrine, see above, p. 69-70.

[262] . Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978), at 352. On this case, see also infra, p, 121 ff.

[263] . Guardians Association v Civil Service Commission, 103 Sup. Court 3221 (1983). For a discussion of the various opinions expressed by the judges, see «The Supreme Court -1982 Term», in Harvard Law Review, 1983, 70-306, at 244 ff.

[264] . «Current administrative interpretations of section 601 are not to be read as requiring bilingual instruction» (R. C. Farrell, op. cit., at 86).

[265] . 20 United States Code section 1703 (f) (1982).

[266] . R. C. Farrell, op. cit., at 93; Proposal, op. cit., at 594. One generally accepts this interpretation because of a comparison of (f) with other provisions of the same Act that explicitly do require discriminatory purpose.

[267] . Castaneda v Pichard, 648 F. 2d 989 (5th. Cir. 1981). The tripartite standard can be summarised as follows: (1) the program must be based on an educational theory recognized as sound or at least as a legitimate experimental strategy by some experts in the field; (2) the program must be reasonably calculated to implement that theory; and (3) the program mus have produced satisfactory results after having been used for a sufficient period of time.

[268] . For arguments that only bilingual education can meet the third step of the standard, see R. C. Farrell, op. cit., at 98 ff., and Columbia Note, op. cit., at 291.

[269] . 22 States as of March 1980, according to S. Rosenbaum, op. cit., at 447.-

[270] . But the budget of this program has been severely cut under the Reagan administration; see «Toughen Up: U.S. Schools Must Improve», in Time, 16 May 1983, p. 73. The new course is outlined in the Official Report by B. F. Birman & A. L. Ginsburg, Addressing the Needs of Language-Minority Children: Issues for Federal Policy, Washington D.C., Department of Education, Office of Planning, Budget and Evaluation, 1981.

[271] . California Education Code, section 52161. The federal Bilingual Education Act itself was amended in the same direction; in order to benefit from federal funds instruction in the native languages can only be organised «to the extent necessary to allow a child to achieve competence in the English languages.

[272] . Carmona v Sheffield, 325 Federal Supplement 1341, at 1342.

[273] . 475 F. 2d 738 (9th Gr. 1973), at 739.

[274] . Guerrero v Carlson, 109 California Reporter 201 (1973). For a general comment on all three cases, see C. P. Blaine, «Breaking the Language Barrier: New Rights for California's Linguistic Minorities», in Pacific Law Journal, 1974, 648-674.

[275] . A striking illustration of this fact is provided by the Californian Bilingual Services Act of 1973; the Act requires state and local agencies which furnish information or render services by contact with a substantial number of non-English-speaking people to employ a sufficient number of qualified bilingual persons in public contact positions or as interpreters. Yet, no fiscal appropriations were made for the Act, which seems to imply that the target of the Act can be met by the administrative personnel that is currently available.

[276] . M. L. Duncan, «The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/Legal Critique», in Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review, 1982, 503-553, at 503.

[277] . See e.g. A. M, Katz, «Benign Preferences: An Indian Decision & the Bakke Case», in American Journal of Comparative Law, 1977, 611-640; S. M. Witten, «Compensatory Discrimination in India: Affirmative Action as a Means of Combatting Class Inequality», in Columbia journal of Transnational Law, 1983, 353-387;W. Mc Kean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p, 228 ff.; J. S. Sigler, Minority Rights - A Comparative Analysis, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1983, pp. 133-148.

[278] . But see the following recent contributions onthis subject in a number of Europeancountries:H.J.Mengel,«Massnahmen'Positiver Diskriminierung'und Grundgesetz», in Juristenzeitung, 1982, 530-538; L. Lustgarten, Legal Control of Racial Discrimination, London, Macmillan, 1980, at 14 ff.; R. Pelloux, «Les nouveaux discours sur l'inégalité et le droit public français», in Revue de Droit Public, 1982, 909-927; B. Sloot, «Legitimatie van positieve discriminatie. Twee redeneerpatronen», in Ars Aequi, 1981, 655-663.

[279] . See above, p. 87-88.

[280] . For the use of those terms, see e.g. N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy, New York, Basic Books, 1975; A. H. Goldman, Justice and Reverse Discrimination, Princeton University Press, 1979; R. K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis, Totawa (N.J.), Rowman and Littlefield, 1980.

[281] .For this argument, see L. Lustgarten, op. cit., at 14 ff.

[282] . «La Generalidad garantizara el uso normal y oficial de los dos idiomas, adoptara las medidas necesarias para asegurar su conocimiento y creara las condiciones que permitan alcanzar su plena igualdad en lo que se refiere a los derechos y deberes de los ciudadanos de Cataluña.»

[283] . «Los poderes publicos de Galicia garantizarán el uso normal y oficial de los dos idiomas y potendaran la utilization del gallego en todos los órdenes de la vida pública, cultural e informativa, y dispondran los medios necesarios para facilitar su conocimiento.»

[284] . See note 144, above.

[285] . Law of 18 April 1983 «de normalización lingüística de Cataluña. Art. 22: «1. (...) la Generalitat podrá subvencionar las publicaciones periódicas redactadas total o parcialmente en Catalan mientras subsistan las condiciones desfavorables que afectan a su producción y difusión. Esta subvention está otorgada sin discrimination y dentro de las previsiones presupuestarias. »2. La Generalitat debe impulsar la normalización del Catalan en las emisoras, a las que podrá subvencionar bajo el correspondiente control parlamentario y con la debida previsión presupuestaria.» Art. 23: «1. La Generalitat debe estimular y fomentar con medidas adecuadas el teatro y la producción de due en Catalan, el doblaje y la substitution en Catalán de películas no catalanas, los espectaculos y cualquier otra manifestación cultural pública en lengua catalana. »2. La Generalitat debe contribuir al fomento del libro en Catalan con medidas que potencien su production editorial y su difusion. (...)». In this same sector, see also the characteristic art. 3 of the Basque Law of 20 May 1982, setting up its autonomous broadcasting company, which specifies that the company's activity must be based, among others, on the principle of linguistic equality, but adding that the objective is to arrive at «an equilibrium in the global level of Basquelanguage programs wihin the Autonomous Community». Now, as the national networks already offer Castillian programs, the Basque government can perfectly decide to establish an Euskera-only channel.

[286] . Order of the Basque Government of 7 June 1982, and Resolution of 5 May 19S3. This measure, as well as those mentioned in the following two notes, is quoted in A. Milian MASSANA, «Noces de legrslacid i juiisprudenda», in Revista de Uengua t Bret, n. 2, 1983, 149-165, at 164.

[287] . Resolutions of 26 May 1982 and of 6 April 1983.

[288] . Resolutions of 7 October 1982 and 8 November 1982.

[289] . Art. 6. 3 of the Basque Statute; art. 5.4 of the Galician Statute; art. 3 of the Catalan normalisation law; art. 4 of the Basque normalisation law.

[290] . See above, p. 81.

[291] . In this field, see the comments by Cr. Hoberlant & Ph. Maystadt, «Exemples de lois taxées d'insconstitutionnalité», in Actuality du controls juridictionnel des lots, Bruxelles, Larder, 1973, 443-516, at 495 ff.

[292] . See the analysis by K. Houben, «Wet en werkelijkheid inzake het taaleven-wich in het Belgisch offiderencorps. Een overzicht van de periode 1938-1982», in Res Publica, 1983, 83-93.

[293] . See above, p. 82.

[294] . «For each field of activity there will be a minimum 'critical mass' of speakers of a given language which must be present before this language can be effectively used in that particular situation» (D. M. Mc Rae, «The Constitutional Protection of Linguistic Rights in Bilingual and Multilingual States», in A. Gotlieb (ed), Human Rights, Federalism and Minorities, Toronto, Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1970, 211-227, at 214).

[295] . Of the four national languages, only three (German, French, Italian) are also official languages of the Confederation, according to the second sentence of article 116 of the Constitution.

[296] . R. H. Billigmeier, A Crisis in Swiss Pluralism. The Romansh and their Relations with the German —and Italian— Swiss in the Perspective of a Millennium, The Hague, Mouton, 1979, at 315.

[297] . See the figures given by K. D. Mayer, «Groupes linguistiques en Suisse», in Recherches Sociologiques, 1977, 75-97, at 84.

[298] . J. Steinberg, Why Switzerland?, Cambridge University Press, 1976, at 113.

[299] . 3 million Swiss francs are granted to the 'Lia Rumantscha' and to 'Pro Grigione Italiano', two private cultural organisations. 2 million go to the canton Ticino. See Europa Eibnica, 1984, 38-39.

[300] . On this point, see R. H. Billigmeier, op. cit., passim; R. Villetta, Abhand-lung zum Sprachenrecht mil besonderer Beruecksichtigung des Rechts der Gemeinden des Kantons Graubttenden, Zuerich, Schulthess, 1978, at 146 ff.;185 ff.; 230 ff. See also the recent Giovanoli case decided by the Federal Tribunal (judgment of 7 May 1982, in Europaeische Grundrecbte Zeitschrift 1982, 317), in which the facts showed that the tribunal of a local district (Albula) in which Romansh was spoken by 50 % of the population, only used German or Italian in its procedings.

[301] . M. J. Esman, «The Politics of Official Bilingualism in Canada», in Political Science Quarterly, 1982, 233-253, at 242.

[302] . T. Modeen, «The Situation of the Finland-Swedish Population...», op. cit., at 129.

[303] . See M. Hiden, «Bestand und Bedeutung der Grundrechte im Bildungsbereich in Finnland», in Europaeische Grundrecbte Zeitschrift, 1981, 640-643, at 641-642.

[304] . This is also the view of M. Hiden, ibid.

[305] . See. S. O'Ciosain, «Bilingualism in Public Administration. The Case of Ireland», in Revista de Llengua i Dret, 1983, n. 2, 11-19, at 14.

[306] . See J. R. Sole & R. Alamany, «La situació del català com a llengua de l'administració al Principal de Catalunya», in C. Duarte & R. Alamany (eds), Actes del collo-qui sobre llengua i administració, Barcelona, Generalitat de Catalunya, 1984, 107-127, at 120,

[307] . «Die Volksgruppen in Oesterreich und ihre angehoerigen gcniessen den Schutz der Gesetze; die Erhaltung der Volksgruppen und die Sicherung ihres Bestandes sind gewaehrleistet. Inhre Sprache und ihr Volkstum sind zu achtenn-.

[308] . «Keinem Volksgruppenangehoerigen darf dutch die Ausuebung oder Nichtausuebung der ihm als solchem zustehenden Rechte ein Nachteil erwachsen».

[309] . See above, p. 101.

[310] . T.h Veiter, «Vo]ksgruppenrecht und Volksgtuppenproblematik in Oesterreich-Ende 1976», in Der Bonauraum, 1976, 5449, at 63-64.

[311] . Decision of 1 February 1973, in Pasicrisie, 1974, IV, 109.

[312] . Cf. supra, p. 68 (and footnote 9).

[313] . This Law is inspired by a stringent policy of territorial unilingualism in conformity with Belgium's overall linguistic policy: Dutch is the exclusive medium of instruction in the Dutch linguistic area (Flanders), French in the French linguistic area (Wallonia), only Brussels having two parallel networks of public schools in each of the languages.

[314] . Decision of 1 February 1973, cit., at 113.

[315] . Id., at 112.

[316] . An expression used by L. Thurow, The Zero Sum Society. Distribution and the Possibilities for Economic Change, New York, Basic Books, 1981, at 184-187. In a certain sense, the red economic minority of any country are the poor. What is meant by the expression 'economic minority' in the present context are structural minorities that are at the same time globally disadvantaged in socio-economical terms.

[317] . See above, p. 75.

[318] . Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In legal writing, see e.g. R. Posner, «The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality o£ Reverse Discrimination», in Supreme Court Review, 1974, 1 it.

[319] . Sharing this view, althought with partially different arguments:J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distriust, op. cit., at 150 ff.; O. M, Fiss, «Groups and the Equal Protection Clauseo, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1975-76, 107-177, at 154 ff.; M. J. Horwitz, «The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism», in Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law review, 1979, 599-613; K. L, Karst & H. W. Horowitz, «The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine», in Id., 7-29; S. Wright, «Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies», in University of Chicago Law Review, 1980, 213-245; see also the cautious but well-argued views of T. Sandalow, «Racial Preferences in Higher Education; Political Responsability and the Judicial Roles, in University of Chicago Law Review, 1975, 653-703,

[320] . Bakke case, cit., at 316 ff.

[321] . Steelworkers v Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

[322] . Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1979).

[323] . See e.g. G. Lyon Caen, «Les travailleurs Strangers - étude comparative»,in Broil Social, 1975, 1-16, at 16.

[324] . Judgment of 5 October 1981, cit. (note 152).

[325] . Id., at 26.

[326] . J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust, op. cit., Chapter 6, p. 135 ff.

[327] . Judgment of 11 August 1954 in Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen 4, 31, at 42:«Mit Bezug auf die parlementarische Repraesentation des als Einheit gedachten Staatsvolfcesbegruendet die Eigenschaft als Partei einer nationalen Minderheitkeine Verschiedenheit die wesentlich ist, und die der Gesetzgeber daher bei der Gestaltung der Rechte der politischen Parteien im Wahlverfahren beruecksichtigen rnuesstes.

[328] . See the overview in S. Furlani, «Sulla rappresentanza parlamentare delle minoranze nazionali», in Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Pubblico, 1955, 213-226 and 972-986. The most radical solution is that experimented for some years in Moravia (and later in Bucovina) during the Austro-Hungarian regime: the total number of seats was divided, from the outset, between the German and Czech population, according to their proportion of the total population, and each voter was registered in a national 'matricle'; see S. Furlani, op. cit., at 976 ff. In American constitutional law, there seems to be wide legislative discretion, though certainly no compulsion, to benefit minorities through an electoral apportionment made at the (moderate) expense of the majority. See the Supreme Court decision in United Jewish Organizations v Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), and the following comments: Note, «Group Representation and Race-Conscious Apportionment: The Role of States and the Federal Courts», in Harvard Law Review, 1978, 1847-1873; Note, «United Jewish Organizations v Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights»-, in 87 Yale Law Journal 1978, 571-602.

[329] . Art. 62 of the Special Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige, as implemented by the Regional Law of 23 July 1973: one seat is reserved to the Ladin group; when no candidate, declaring himself a Ladin, is elected according to the normal electoral rules, the Ladin candidate with the highest number of votes replaces the non-Ladin candidate of the same list who is elected with the lowest number of votes. See A. Pizzorusso, «La 'garanzia di rappresentanza' del gruppo linguistico ladino nel Consiglio regionale e nel Consiglio provinciale di Bolzano», in Le Regioni, 1973, 1119 ff.

[330] . Art. 61.2 of the Special Statute of Trentino-Alto Adige. This requirement is couched in general terms, so that it not only benefits the Ladins, but also the German and Italian groups in those areas where they form only a small minority.

[331] . Law of 2 May 1974, «Contributo dello Stato al finanziamento dei partiti politici», art. 1; the same rule applies to the funding of the parliamentary fractions (art. 3 b of the same Law).

[332] . Law of 24 January 1979, art. 12.9.

[333] . Above, p. 96.

[334] . «Gli interessi afferenti a tali oggetti sono, infatti, comuni a tutti gli appartenenti alla stessa categoria professional, lavoratori o datori di lavoio die siano, senza che le differenze di lingua o di origine etnica assumano al riguardo giuridica rilevanza» (judgment of 16 April 1975, in Le Regioni, 1975, 942, at 953).

[335] . Judgment of 19 February 1976, in Le Regioni, 1976, 503 (with note by A. Pizzorusso).

[336] . Id., at 511:«Né puo ravvisarsi nella imposizione dell'onere di adesione ad organizzazioni maggiori, legalmente riconosciute e rapperesentate nel CNEL, una meno-mazione delle caratteristiche peculiarita tradizionalmente proprie di quelle associazioni, attraverso una sorta di larvata assimilazione forzata che porti a snaturarle, essendo rimesse alla loro libera determinazione la scelta tra aderire o non aderire alle corrispondenti organizzazioni maggiori».

[337] . Id., at 511-512: «Verament, invece, i diritti di tali minoranze sarebbero vulnerati qualora 1'adesione delle (Ioro) associazioni (...) alle organizzazioni nazionali comportasse, in forza di particolari norme che queste disciplinano o di concrete determinazioni adottate dai loro organi deliberanti, delle limitazioni al modo d'essere originario delle prime, con specifico riguardo alla differenziazione etnicolingustica in esse esprimentesi».

[338] . See the remarks by S. Bartole in his case-note under the judgment of 16 April 1975, cit. (note 240). But see the contrasting views of the Regional Administrative Tribunal for Friuli-Venezia Giulia (judgment of 16 January 1976, in Le Regioni, 1976, 1189, with note by S. Bartole), annulling the appointment, by the regional authorities, of the members of the Provincial Committee for Artisanship of Trieste, because of the lack of any representative of the 'Associazione slovena per l'economia', grouping the Slovene operators of the sector. Equal treatment implied, according to the tribunal, that the Slovene association be represented in proportion to its numerical importance, or even have a guaranteed representation beyond any numerical condition. The Tribunal did not need to decide between the 'proportional' and the 'affirmative' option, as the decision of the regional authorities did not meet any of the two standards. In contrast with this innovative decision, the very same court has recently taken a very restrictive stance on the rights of the minority, by annulling an act of the Trieste Provincial Council which authorised the use of the Slovene language in the Council's debates: decision of 23 September 1982 of the Regional Administrative Tribunal for Friuli-Venezia Giulia, in Le Regioni, 1983, 250 with note by S. Bartole, «Uso della lingua slovena nelle assemblee elettive e riserva di legge». The court argued that action in favour of linguistic minorities could only be taken by the central State; yet, as was argued earlier on, the Constitutional Court itself has now abandoned this doctrine (cf. supra, p. 92-93).