Antropocentrismo y especismo: aspectos conceptuales y normativos
| Autor | Catia Faria - Eze Paez |
| Cargo | PhD Candidate, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain - Postdoctoral researcher, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain |
| Páginas | 95-103 |
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Anthropocentrism, as a moral view, can be characterized as follows:
Either nonhuman animals are not to be morally considered or their moral consideration is lower than the moral consideration of human animals.
Thus defined, anthropocentrism is incompatible with the principle of equal consideration of interests. This principle states that interests of equal intensity -or importance for the one whose interests they are- provide us with reasons for acting of equal strength. All other attributes of individuals are deemed irrelevant with regards to whether their interests give us reasons, or to the strength of those reasons.
Contrariwise, according to anthropocentrism, there is one additional attribute of normative importance, namely, the species to which the individual belongs. It is only in case that the individual belongs to the human species that her interests give us reasons for acting, or reasons for acting fully as strong as the importance of the interests at stake. In all other cases, in which the individual belongs to a nonhuman species, her interests provide us with either no reasons at all or with reasons for acting less than fully as strong as the importance of her interests.
It is common to use "speciesism" and "anthropocentrism" interchangeably, as if expressing equivalent concepts. This usage can be observed in several attempts to define speciesism in the literature. While they do not explicitly assert this relation of equivalence, they certainly presuppose it. Here are some famous examples:
"I use the word ‘speciesism’ to describe the widespread discrimination that is practiced by man against the other species, and to draw a parallel with racism." (RYDER 1983, p. 5).
"Speciesism is the inclusion of all human animals within, and the exclusion of all other animals from, the moral circle." (WALDAU 2001, p. 38).
"A speciesist position, at least the paradigm of such a position, would take the form of declaring that no animal is a member of the moral community because no animal belongs to the "right" species- namely, Homo sapiens." (REGAN 1985, p. 155).
Yet these definitions are problematic. It is possible to conceive a position that would (i) prescribe an unjustified preferential consideration of members of a particular nonhuman species against members of others. Imagine, for example, someone who maintained that only birds should be given moral consideration and that their interests should always be preferred over the interests of members of other nonhuman species, the reason being that this person likes birds but does not feel any sympathy for other nonhuman animals. It seems that this person is being speciesist, insofar as she is favouring the members of a certain species (nonhuman) over the members of another (nonhuman), based on an unjustified
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appeal to species membership (or more accurately, on an unjustified appeal to her relation of sympathy towards the members of certain species, namely, birds). She is not being anthropocentric, though, for she is not favouring human interests over nonhuman ones.
In addition, it could also be the case that a certain position (ii) prescribed an unjustified disadvantageous consideration of members of a particular nonhuman species, though not of members of other nonhuman species. Imagine someone who claimed that all sentient nonhuman animals should be morally considerable, except rats, whom she finds repugnant. It seems that this person is establishing an unjustified differentiation among individuals, based on their membership to a certain species (or based on her relation of repugnancy with all the members of a certain species). She is clearly being speciesist, though hardly anthropocentric: she is not giving preferential consideration or treatment to...
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