Killing Federalism from Above: Constitutional Culture, the Italian Founding, and the Seeds of Contemporary Instability

AutorNikolai G. Wenzel
CargoFlagler College (St. Augustine, Florida, USA)
Páginas205-219
KILLING FEDERALISM FROM ABOVE:
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE, THE ITALIAN FOUNDING,
AND THE SEEDS OF CONTEMPORARY INSTABILITY1
Nikolai G. Wenzel
Flagler College (St. Augustine, Florida, USA)
OUTLINE: I. INTRODUCTION. II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF ITALIAN HISTORY. III.
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY. 1. Constitutional Culture and Constitu-
tional Stickiness. 2. Defining Constitutional Success. IV. 1861: ITALY'S CONSTITU-
TION AS FOREIGN IMPOSITION 1. Annexation and centralization. 2. Why
Centralization? 2.1. Unity first, then institutional design. 2.2. Making Italy, making
Italians. 2.3. Weak institutional capacity outside Piedmont. 3. Why the constitution
didn't stick. 3.1. No sense of Italy 3.2. Quashing a tradition of local autonomy. V.
CONCLUSION.
Abstract: With chronic governmental instability, a dangerously high debt-to-GDP
ratio, Northern secessionism, and Southern under-development, Italy continues to
stagger along. This paper uses the lens of constitutional culture to examine the
Italian founding in 1861. Despite arguments for imposed centralization from above,
Italy would have fared better under a federal system that respected the peninsula's
rich tradition of local autonomy. Although counter-factuals are impossible to prove,
a federal system would likely have led to greater stability and growth.
Keywords: Italian founding; Italian constitution; federalism; constitutional political
economy; constitutional culture
I. INTRODUCTION
Italy appears to be perpetually in crisis; in fact, it has become a parlor game to
make fun of Italian politics, corruption and instability. And, yet, Italy never ceases
to amaze. (Sabetti, 2000, ix) writes of the "paradox of Italy – poor government
performance in contrast with successes across a broad array of human endeavor."
With an estimated debt/GDP ratio of 120%, Italy is at the center of the Euro debt
crisis. The country ranks 83rd out of 144 countries in economic freedom, and scores
a dismal 3.9/10 on the Transparency International index (closer to Mexico's 3/10
than the Western European average of six to nine). The country has had 55 prime
ministers, presiding over 64 different governments, since 1948 – for an average
governmental longevity of approximately one year. The current government is a
weak centrist coalition, coming on the heels of a technocratic government that was
1 Acknowledgements: For insights and discussion, the author wishes to thank L. Marco Bassani,
Enrico Colombatto, Angelo Petroni, Domenico daEmpoli, Stefano daEmpoli, Francesca Spigarelli and
Attilio Muncio. Thanks also to Russ Sobel and the participants in a November 2013 economics
workshop at the College of Charleston. The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support from the
H.B. Earhart Foundation is gratefully acknowledged
Historia Constitucional
ISSN 1576-4729, n.16, 2015. http://www.historiaconstitucional.com, págs. 205-219

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