Transition to democracy and the Brazilian presidential system post-1946: the relationship between institutional design and political instability
| Autor | Claudia Paiva Carvalho |
| Páginas | 225-246 |
Transition to democracy and the Brazilian presidential system post-1946:
the relationship between institutional design and political instability
Claudia Paiva Carvalho
1. Introduction: transitioning to democracy and adapting the presidential sys-
tem; 2. The dispute between the presidential and the parliamentary systems; 3.
Political crisis, presidential system, and institutional reform; 4. Final remarks:
presidential system in transition
1. Introduction: transitioning to democracy and adapting the presidential
system
The Brazilian Constitution of 1946 restored representative democracy af-
ter eight years of dictatorship. During the “New State” regime (Estado Novo,
1937-1945), there were no elections, and Parliament was kept closed. Presi-
dent-dictator Getúlio Vargas concentrated legislative powers and appointed
interveners to govern states. Restoring democracy required changes in the
system of government. At the time, there was a consensus that presidential
power should be contained in order to avoid the abuses and arbitrary mea-
sures practiced by the previous regime. But there was disagreement on how
this should be done.
During the constituent process that took place from February to Septem-
ber 1946, some representatives supported the parliamentary campaign led by
deputy Raul Pilla. Pilla was the main sponsor of parliamentary reform as a
means to improve democracy in Brazil. But he did not succeed in approving
the parliamentary system in the constitutional frame of 1946. The presiden-
Most constituents believed that the presidential system better suited
the Brazilian political tradition and would better serve the need for State
intervention. As the State’s action spread to areas of economic policy and
social assistance, the importance of a strong Executive branch became more
prominent. At the same time, in a Cold War scenario, a strong State was also
defended to face the so-called communist threat. The constitution framers
the State to perform such roles. Therefore, the transition to democracy in-
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volved designing an Executive branch that would be both limited and pow-
erful.
To prevent abuse, the Constitution would establish constitutional limits
on presidential power, especially by reinforcing the mechanisms of Legisla-
tive control. The multi-party system and proportional representation should
balance the president’s power, since the government would depend on con-
gressional support to conduct its agenda. The mediation of national parties
and the functioning of the electoral system, where secrecy of the ballot was
choice of congressmen and state governors. Finally, the president would be
subject to congressional investigation and oversight and, ultimately, to im-
peachment in the case of serious misconduct.
Despite the adjustments, the presidential system was a key factor in the
political instability of Brazilian democracy after 1946. Three major political
-
tween the Executive and the Legislative, as well as attempts to remove pres-
crises were solved through political interference of the Armed Forces, though
the military did not remain in power, but returned the government to civil-
ians. In 1964, however, one last crisis – also featured by strong disputes be-
tween president and Congress – would collapse democracy and install a mil-
itary dictatorship that would last 21 years.
There seems to be no doubt that political crises challenged the presidential
system. But one must ask whether the dysfunctions of the presidential system
are to be blamed for the political instability. A growing number of congress-
men thought so and endorsed consecutive attempts along the 1950s to amend
the Constitution in order to adopt the parliamentary system. Nonetheless, all
attempts failed up to President Jânio Quadros’ resignation in August 1961,
which was followed by an impasse created by the attempted military veto on
the inauguration of Vice President João Goulart (Jango). As a compromise
Congress approved a hasty implementation of a parliamentary system. The
parliamentary experience was both unstable and ineffective. After successive
cabinets fell from power, a plebiscite held in January 1963 approved the re-
turn of the presidential system by a large majority.
Given this scenario, the present research investigates how the presiden-
tial system responded to Brazil’s transition into democracy post-1945. Based
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