The zero-hour contract in platform work. Should we ban it or embrace it?
| Autor | Anna Ginès Fabrellas |
| Cargo | Universitat Ramon Llull, ESADE Law School |
| Páginas | 29-43 |
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Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
Submission date: October 2018
Accepted date: December 2018
Published in: February 2019
ARTICLE
The zero-hour contract
in platform work
Should we ban it or embrace it?*
Anna Ginès Fabrellas
Universitat Ramon Llull, ESADE Law School
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to analyze the zero-hour contract in the context of platform work; specifically,
the risks and opportunities of this type of provision of services. In the context of the sharing economy
and gig-economy, there have emerged multiple App-based companies that have significantly altered the
way in which services are provided. Companies like Uber, Lift, Taskrabbit, Deriveroo, Glovo or Amazon
Mechanical Turk have introduced new forms of work that have altered the boundaries of Labor Law.
The model of these companies is the division of their production into microtasks, the externalization of
their entire production to a wide number of independent contractors through an App or webpage and
the hiring of each service on-demand. As a result, new technologies have allowed these companies to
avoid hiring workers and to provide their services entirely through self-employed workers. This hiring
on-demand implies the use, de facto, of the zero-hour contract, as platform workers are not subject to
a specific working time regime, having absolute liberty to determine, not only their schedule, but also
their working time and, even, their willingness to work. In this context, the aim of the paper is to analyze
the zero-hour scheme in the context of platform work. The final objective of the paper is to determine,
from a lege ferenda perspective, if jurisdictions should introduce this type of contract to promote the
business model used by digital platforms or, on the contrary, if they should ban it.
Keywords
sharing economy, platform work, worker, self-employed worker, independent contractor, zero-hour
contract
Topic
platform work
* Project supported by a 2016 BBVA Foundation Grant for Researchers and Cultural Creators.
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
El contrato de cero horas en el trabajo en plataformas digitales
¿Debe prohibirse o aceptarse?
Resumen
El objetivo del artículo es analizar el contrato de cero horas dentro del contexto del trabajo en plata-
formas digitales y, específicamente, los riesgos y oportunidades que presenta este tipo de prestación
de servicios. En el contexto de la economía colaborativa y la economía de bolos han surgido múltiples
empresas basadas en aplicaciones informáticas que han modificado significativamente la manera en la
que se proporcionan los servicios. Compañías como Uber, Lift, TaskRabbit, Deliveroo, Glovo o Amazon
Mechanical Turk han introducido nuevas formas de trabajo que han alterado los límites del derecho
laboral. El modelo de trabajo de estas compañías se basa en la división de su producción en microtareas,
o bolos, en la externalización de toda su producción a un gran número de contratistas independientes a
través de una aplicación o página web, y en la contratación de cada servicio bajo demanda. El resultado
es que las nuevas tecnologías han permitido que estas compañías eviten contratar empleados y puedan
prestar sus servicios íntegramente a través de trabajadores autónomos. La contratación bajo demanda
lleva implícito, de facto, el uso del contrato de cero horas, puesto que los trabajadores de la plataforma
no están sujetos a un régimen horario específico y tienen absoluta libertad para determinar no solo su
calendario sino también su horario laboral e incluso su disponibilidad para trabajar. En este contexto, el
objetivo del artículo es analizar el régimen de cero horas dentro del contexto del trabajo en plataformas
digitales. El objetivo final del documento es determinar, desde la perspectiva de la elaboración de una
futura legislación, si las jurisdicciones deberían incluir este tipo de contrato para fomentar el modelo de
negocio utilizado por las plataformas digitales o si, por el contrario, deberían prohibirlo.
Palabras clave
economía colaborativa, trabajo en plataformas, empleado, trabajador autónomo, contratista indepen-
diente, contrato de cero horas
Tema
trabajo en plataformas
1. Introduction
In the context of the sharing economy, there have emerged
multiple App-based companies that have significantly
altered the way in which services are provided. Companies
like Uber, Lift, Taskrabbit, Deriveroo, Glovo or Amazon
Mechanical Turk have introduced new forms of work that
have altered the boundaries of Labor Law.
The model of these companies is the division of their
production into microtasks, the externalization of their
entire production to a large number of self-employed
workers or independent contractors through an app or
webpage and the hiring of each service on-demand. As a
result, new technologies have allowed these companies to
avoid hiring workers and to provide their services entirely
through self-employed workers.
The hiring on-demand model implies the use, de facto, of
the zero-hour contract. Service providers in app-based
companies are not subject to a specific working time regime.
On the contrary, one of the characteristics of platform
work is that service providers have the absolute liberty to
determine, not only their schedule, but also their working
time and, even, their willingness to work. As a result, they are
hired for the specific duration of a specific service; hence,
being subject to a zero-hour scheme, where they are not
guaranteed a minimum number of working hours, rather
being hired solely for the service provided.
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
The aim of this paper is to analyze the zero-hour contract in
the context of platform work, and the end objective of is to
determine, from a lege ferenda perspective, if jurisdictions
should introduce this type of contract to promote the
business model used by digital platforms or, on the contrary,
if they should ban it to protect workers’ interests.
2. Platform work and its
consequences on labor relations
2.1. The platform work model
The platform work model used by app-based companies and
online platforms like Uber, Lift, Taskrabbit, Deriveroo, Glovo
and Amazon Mechanical Turk is based on three elements.
1
The first element of this model of platform work is the
subdivision of work into microtasks.
2
New technologies have
enabled these companies to divide the service into multiple
independent short-term assignments. That is, instead of
providing the service as a whole, these platforms provide
individual independent very short-term services, such as, for
example, one car ride for Uber and Lift, one food delivery
for Deliveroo or Glovo, and translation of one sentence or
description of one image for Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The second element of the platform work model is the use of
a new form of outsourcing: crowdsourcing.
3
Online platforms
outsource the entire service they provide. Nevertheless,
instead of outsourcing the service to a small or limited number
of companies, they outsource it to a large number of self-
employed workers. As a result of new technologies,
4
these
App-based companies use the App or software developed
to perform an open call to attract service providers and
each microtask is outsourced to a self-employed worker
or independent contractor operating on the platform.
1. See Ginès i Fabrellas (2017 p. 190-192).
2. Molina (2015).
3. Howe (2006) and later used and studies by Brabham (2013) or Epstein (2015).
4. Todolí Signes (2015, p. 3).
5. V.A. (2015).
6. De Stefano (2016).
7. Dagnino (2015, p. 4).
8. Rogers (2015, p. 86-89) and Hidalgo (2018, p. 224-225).
The platform work model requires that the service is
outsourced to a large crowd (hence the name ‘crowdsourcing’).
To a large number of self-employed workers or independent
contractors that is high enough to ensure that there is
sufficient supply to meet the demand at all times. Then,
each microtask is outsourced to a specific self-employed
worker. Consequently, these companies do not have all the
necessary means and infrastructure to provide the service
they offer, rather they outsource the entire production to
a large number of self-employed workers.
The third element of the platform work model, which is
linked to the previous one,is hiring on-demand
5
or just-
in-time
6
(the term on-demand economy has been used to
describe the companies that use this form of hiring). Hiring
on-demand means hiring self-employed workers at the exact
moment when the demand or request for the service occurs
7
and for the specific duration of the provision of said service.
New technologies, again, enable this model of production,
as they allow to the precise moment when the demand
appears to be identified and are able to par this demand
with supply in a matter of seconds. As a result, providers of
services in the context of online platforms are not hired on
a regular or permanent basis, rather they are hired solely
for the duration of the provision of a specific job or gig (the
term gig-economy has also been used to describe these
app-based companies).
The combination of the former three elements has enabled
these app-based companies to configure a business model
based on the provision of services completely outsourced to
a large number of independent contractors or self-employed
workers, who are hired at and for the exact time the demand
takes places.
This model has clear business advantages, as new
technologies have improved the connection between
demand and supply, it reduces transaction costs,8 it enables
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
the exploitation of network economies9 and it offers greater
flexibility in the management of working time by eliminating
inactive or unproductive periods.
10
Nevertheless, it also
entails significant social risks, as it substitutes more or less
permanent or long-term relationships for very short-term
hiring. Furthermore, in the analysis in the following section,
it provides an escape from labor and social protection, as
service providers are hired as self-employed workers or
independent contractors and not workers or employees.
2.2. The “uberization” of labor relations
and the misclassification of workers
The platform work model has led to the “uberization” of labor
relations (term attributed to the form of work employed
by Uber, a paradigmatic example of company acting in the
gig-economy). As mentioned in the previous section, this
model provides an escape from labor and social protection,
as it is based on the hiring of service providers that are
formally considered self-employed workers or independent
contractors.
The provision of services on online platforms is based on
two characteristics, which are common for the majority
of online platforms acting in the gig-economy: the use of
own means and infrastructure and the liberty to determine
working time. First, service providers on online platforms use
their own means of production and infrastructure (car, bike,
motorcycle, computer, etc.) and bear the expenses related
with the provision of services. Second, and furthermore,
they have the liberty to determine their working time; that
is, they are free to determine, not only their schedule, but
their working time and, even, their willingness to work.
9. Doménech Pascual (2015, p. 6) and Hidalgo (2018, p. 224-225).
10. See Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft (2014, p. 215), Prassl. and Risak (2016, p. 7).
11. This is the conclusion reached by the United States District Court (Northern District of California), March 11, 2015 in the case O’Connor
et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (No. C-13-3826 EMC, March 11, 2015), the California Labor Commission in its decision of June 3, 2015 in
the case Barbara Ann Berwick v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Case no. 11-46739 EK (2015), the Bureau of Labor and Industries of the State
of Oregon, October 14, 2015, the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, June 1, 2015 (Case No, 5371509 – Reopened) or the
Employment Tribunal, October 28, 2016, case Mr. Y Aslam, Mr. J Farrar & others vs. Uber (Case no.s: 2202550/2015 & others). In application
of the Spanish legislation, see the decision of the Catalan Labor Inspection, March 9, 2015 also regarding Uber (case o.no. 8/0025767/14)
or the decision of the Valencian Labor Inspection, December 19, 2017 regarding Deliveroo (case o.no. 462017008125108).
12. For example, Uber sets specific instructions regarding the provision of services, like the need to dress professionally, lower the music in
the car, open the door of the car for customers or even accompany them with an umbrella when entering or exiting the car in rainy days.
Although these are formally considered mere recommendations, the judicial decisions have qualified them as actual employer instructions.
Since these recommendations are public, customers expect to be treated accordingly. As a result, to avoid obtaining bad reviews, drivers
act accordingly, and hence they have become actual employer instructions. See the decision of the United States District Court (Northern
District of California) in the case O´Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC (2015). In this sense, see Aloisi (2015, P. 18).
These two characteristics are common of self-employed
workers and independent contractors, thus justifying their
classification as such.
Nevertheless, the majority of judicial and administrative
decisions that have analyzed platform work have concluded
that there is a misclassification of workers, as well as a
misclassification of other characteristics of the relationship
between the platform and service providers that identify
them as workers.
11
According to these decisions, in spite of the liberty to manage
their working time, the use of own means of production,
and assumption of expenses, service providers on online
platforms cannot be considered self-employed workers as
(i) they do not have an authentic and autonomous business
organization because they are subject to the platforms’
instructions and control and (ii) there is no ownership of
the real infrastructure, assumption of risk and intervention
in the economic activity.
The first argument used by the referenced judicial and
administrative decisions is that service providers on online
platforms do not have an authentic and autonomous
business organization, because they are subject to the
platform’s management and control. Platforms like Uber,
Lift, Deliveroo or Amazon Mechanical Turk exercise
management and control by determining the terms of the
service, establishing instructions that must be followed by
service providers
12
or prohibiting contract between users
outside the platform. Some platforms even have a selection
process prior to accessing the platform. This is the case for
Uber, which requires a valid driver’s license for a minimum
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
of 3 years, a vehicle that is less than 10 years old, insurance,
geographical knowledge of the city and an interview with
an Uber employee.
13
Furthermore, online platforms also exercise control over
working time. As mentioned previously, service providers
on online platforms are free to determine, not only their
schedule, but their working time and, even, their willingness
to work. Nevertheless, the judicial and administrative bodies
that have analyzed these platforms conclude that this
freedom is only perceived or is incomplete. The platform
exercises indirect forms of control over working time with
economic incentives or by generating expectations to induce
service providers to work during high-demand periods.
For example, Uber grants economic incentives to those
drivers who are logged on to the app a minimum number
of hours a week or during specific days or hours,
14
and it
reserves the right to disconnect those drivers that reject too
many requests.
15
Similarly, Deliveroo also offers economic
incentives to riders that connect during high-demand periods,
assigns riders to specific schedules—sometimes modifying
their preferences—and limits changes to schedules.
16
Finally, online platforms also exercise indirect forms of
control over work performance. Most of the online platforms
have a customer rating system that allows customers to
rate the quality of the service received. This rating system
allows customers to share information with future and
potential customers regarding the quality of the service
and, specifically, of the service provider. However, this
customer rating system is also used by the platform to
adopt business decisions like the distribution of work or
maintenance of the platform. Uber, for example, reserves
the right to disconnect those drivers with low ratings and
13. Information obtained from the decision of the California Labor Commission, June 3, 2015 in the case Barbara Ann Berwick v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (case no. 11-46739 EK (2015)), the United States District Court (Northern District of California), March 11, 2015 in the
case O’Connor et al. v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (No. C-13-3826 EMC) and the Catalan Labor Inspection, March 9, 2015.
14. In this sense, according to the decision of the Catalan Labor Inspection, March 9, 2015, Uber awards 100€ to drivers that log on minimum 15
hours a week (independent on the number of services) and €100 to those that complete 10 trips a week. Furthermore, it recognizes other
economic incentives to drivers that log on during special events that take place in the city, during high demand hours and that accept
trips in high demand areas of the city.
15. According to documentation analyzed by the United States District Court (Northern District of California) in the case O’Connor et al. v. Uber
Technologies, Inc. (No. C-13-3826 EMC, March 11, 2015), Uber send its drivers an email stating that a “dispatch acceptance rate [of 60%]
is too low… Please work towards a dispatch acceptance rate of 80%. If you are unable to significantly improve your dispatch acceptance
rate, Uber may suspend your account”.
16. Decision of the Valencian Labor Inspection, December 19, 2017 regarding Deliveroo (case no. 462017008125108).
17. Bergvall-Kåreborn and Howcroft (2014, p. 218). For a more detailed analysis of the model of production used by Amazon Mechanical Turk
see Ginès i Fabrellas (2016, p. 66-85).
Amazon Mechanical Turk, through the use of an algorithm,
assigns tasks among turkers according to their personal
rating,
17
reserving better quality tasks,in terms of duration
and payment, to turkers with higher ratings.
The second argument used to support the misclassification
of workers on online platforms is the absence of ownership
of the real infrastructure of the economic activity, in terms
of the assumption of risk and the capacity to intervene in
the economic activity.
As mentioned previously, one common characteristic
of platform work is that service providers use their own
infrastructure, assume the expenses related with the
provision of the service and receive payment according
to the number of services provided. Nevertheless, the
judicial and administrative decisions that have analyzed
this matter conclude that, in spite of the former, they are
not self-employed workers, as they do not assume all the
risks nor receive all the returns on the economic activity. The
app or software used for the provision of the service—the
real infrastructure of the productive activity—is developed,
maintained and owned by the platform; the expenses of the
economic activity are borne by the platform—essentially,
expenses related with the creation, development and
maintenance of the App or webpage, marketing and strategy
costs, costs of expanding to other markets, etc.; the platform,
after subtracting the payment to service providers, retains
the returns on the economic activity; and service providers
do not act in the market as real self-employed workers or
independent contractors, as the adoption of business,
commercial and strategic decisions, like fixing the prices,
terms of payment, terms and conditions of the service, etc.
also corresponds to the platform.
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
Nevertheless, the debate regarding the classification of
service providers on online platforms is not resolved, as
there are several court and administrative rulings that have
excluded their nature as workers or employees.
18
According
to these decisions, the use of own means of production
to provide the service, the assumption of costs and the
freedom to determine working time exclude the employment
relationship of service providers in platforms, hence resulting
in real self-employed workers or independent contractors.
In my opinion, as an important section of the literature,19 the
provision of services in the context of online platforms in
the gig-economy is misclassifying workers as self-employed
workers or independent contractors. Platform work must be
categorized as dependent and subordinate work and, hence,
the object of an employment relationship. The indirect forms
of management and control used by platforms, as well as
the lack of a true business organization by service providers
qualifies them as workers or employees.
As concluded by the European Court of Justice in its ruling
of December 20, 2017 (case Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi
v. Uber Systems Spain, S.L., C-434/15) and, more recently,
of April 10, 2018 (case Uber France SAS v. Nabil Bensalem,
C-320/16), Uber is a transportation service company and
not a mere intermediation service.
“[T]he intermediation service provided by the company
concerned was inherently linked to the offer by that company
of non-public urban transport services, in view of the fact
that, in the first place, that company provided an application
without which those drivers would not have been led to provide
transport services, and the persons who wished to make an
urban journey would not have used the services provided by
those drivers and, in the second place, that company exercised
decisive influence over the conditions under which services
were provided by those drivers, inter alia by determining the
maximum fare, by collecting that fare from the customer before
18. Resolution of the Australian Fair Work Commission, December 8, 2017 in the case Kaseris v Rasier Pacific V.O.F ([2017] FWC 6610) or
resolution of Paris’ Conseil des Prud’Hommes, January 29, 2018 and, more recently in Spain, decision of the Juzgado de lo Social no. 39,
Madrid, September 3, 2018.
19. Sprage (2015); Serrano Olivares (2017, p. 35-37); Todolí Signes (2017, p. 63-64); Sierra Benítez (2017, p. 248-249); among others.
20. Decision of the European Court of Justice, April 10, 2018 (case Uber France SAS v. Nabil Bensalem, C-320/16).
21. Calvo Gallego (2017, p. 360-361).
22. See Ginès i Fabrellas and Gálvez Duran (2016, p. 1-44).
23. In this sense, see Serrano García. (2017, p. 209-228)
24. Rodríguez-Piñero Royo (2017, p. 146-148).
paying part of it to the non-professional driver of the vehicle,
and by exercising a certain control over the quality of the
vehicles, the drivers and their conduct, which could, in some
circumstances, result in their exclusion”.
20
In my opinion, the qualification of online platforms as
service providers and not mere technological companies
is directly linked to the nature of their relationship with
service providers.
21
The arguments that are used to qualify
Uber as a transportation service company—essentially, the
intervention in the economic activity—led, in turn, to the
qualification of service providers as workers or employees.
The intervention in the economic activity by the platform to
guarantee a uniform service of a certain minimum quality
results in indirect forms of management and control of the
provision of services and in the elimination of all possibility
for service providers to develop, in the context of the
platform, a true and autonomous business activity.
In conclusion, my position in the debate regarding the
qualification of the relationship between the online platform
and service providers is clear: it is an employment relationship.
22
2.3. …however, there is more to the “uberization”
of labor relations
The misclassification of workers in the gig-economy is
not, however, the only or most worrying expression of
“uberization” of labor relations, in the sense of reducing
job quality or increasing precarious work.
23
There are other
characteristics of platform work that contribute to the
precarization of labor relations, such as the substitution of
permanent or, more or less, long-term hiring for very short-
term hiring, remuneration by gig and the automization of labor
relations which reduces workers’ effective collective rights.24
As mentioned previously, new technologies have enabled
these companies to divide the service into multiple
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
independent short-term assignments and hire workers,
misclassified as independent contractors, at the exact
moment when the demand for the service occurs and
for the precise time of the provision of the service. As a
result, new technologies have been implemented on online
platforms to substitute more or less permanent or long-term
relationships for very short-term hiring. In this sense, as will
be described in more detail in the next section, platform
work uses, de facto, the zero-hour contract. This is a form
of precarization as it increases labor instability and, hence,
leads to more labor insecurity and lower earnings.
Related with the former, platform workers are compensated
by gig or service. Although there are some differences
between platforms and, even, among different countries,
most platforms workers perceive compensationdirectly
proportionate to the number of gigs or services performed.
For each service provided, platform workers receive
compensation, minus a percentage subtracted by the
platform in terms of payment for accessing the app or
software. Some platforms also use economic incentives for
being logged in for a minimum number of hours or during
specific period, such as the abovementioned examples of
Uber and Deliveroo. Nevertheless, the main method of
compensation for services is per service or gig.
Compensation per service or gig is permitted in most legal
systems. This is the case, for example, in the Spanish legal
system where article 26.3 of the Workers’ Statute specifically
states that the base salary is the “fixed remuneration per unit
of time or service”. Nevertheless, this form of remuneration
can also be considered a form of work precarization when
combined with the zero-hour contract, as platform workers
do not receive compensation for the periods where, in spite
of being logged on to the app and available, they are not
providing a specific service.
Finally, as mentioned, the correct classification of platform
workers as workers or employees is not enough to ensure
they benefit from effective collective rights. The geographic
automization of the provision of services, the unstable nature
of the work and the high turnover among platform workers
hinders their organization and the exercise of collective rights,
25. Rodríguez-Piñero Royo (2017, p. 214).
26. For example, the Independent Drivers Guild integrated by Uber or Lyft drivers (
27. <http://www.eldiario.es/catalunya/trabajo/repartidores-Deliveroo-convocan-primera-economia_0_658985300.html> [Accessed: 28.02.2018].
28. Mercader Uguina (2017, p. 172-181).
such as union organization and collective action.
25
In spite
of successful examples of platform workers organizations26
and collective actions,
27
the current regulation in most legal
systems is not adapted to guarantee effective forms of
Workers’ representation and collective action, like online
participation in the election of workers’ representatives or
disconnection from the platform as form of collective action.
28
3. The zero-hour contract in platform
work
3.1. Hiring on-demand and the de facto use
of the zero-hour contract
Platform work, as analyzed previously, uses a model of
provision of services based on crowdsourcing and hiring on-
demand. One of the characteristics of platform work is that
service providers on online platforms are not subject to a
specific working time regime, rather they have the freedom
to determine their own working time. Platform workers have
the liberty to determine, not only their schedule, but the
number of hours they work on a given day, week or month
and, even, their willingness to work.
This model implies the use, de facto, of the zero-hour
contract, because they are not hired for a specific number
of hours, but they are hired on-demand, that is they are
hired for the concrete duration of the specific service.
When service providers are available they log on the App
or software and wait to be contacted to provide a specific
service. As a result, they are not guaranteed a minimum
number of working hours nor, consequently, a minimum
remuneration amount.
The working time scheme for platform workers is, in essence,
the zero-hour scheme. The zero-hour contract scheme
implies that workers are hired by an employer without,
however, being subject to a specific working time. Workers
are then called by the employer to work when there is a
labor need and, evidently, paid according to the number of
hours effectively worked.
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
As can be seen, the working time scheme for platform work
is similar to the zero-hour contract scheme as platform
workers are neither guaranteed a minimum working time
and are called to work when there is a labor need. The
difference, however, between the zero-hour contract and
the working time regime in platform work is the origin of
the call. While in the scenario of the zero-hour contract
the employer is the one responsible for calling the worker
and, hence, activating the contract and his/her obligation
to provide services, in platform work it is the worker him/
herself that decides when to log on the app and make him or
herself available to provide services. Despite this difference,
in essence, the business model employed by online platforms
based on hiring on-demand implies, essentially and de facto,
the use of the zero-hour contract.
In this context, especially since the previous section
concludes the qualification of platform workers as workers or
employees, it is essential to analyze the legality of the zero-
hour contract. Furthermore, it is necessary to determine,
from a lege ferenda perspective, if legal systems should
introduce this type of contract to promote the business
model used by digital platforms or, on the contrary, if they
should ban it.
3.2. The illegality of the zero-hour contract
in the Spanish legal system
The Spanish legal system does not recognize the legality of
the zero-hour contract because, as this section analyses, the
regulation requires contracts to stipulate working time and
there are limits to increases above ordinary working time.
According to article 34.1 of the Spanish Workers’ Statue,
working time applicable to a specific employment relationship
must be determined in the collective agreement or in the
employment contract. Hence, the current labor regulation
requires the employment relationship to specify a number of
hours to be worked. Furthermore, article 8.5 of the Workers’
Statue requires companies, even when contracts have not
been formalized in writing, to inform the employee in writing
about the essential labor conditions -including, thus, working
time- when the contract has a minimum duration of four
weeks.
29. Ginès i Fabrellas and Luque Parra (2016, p. 64).
The tacit prohibition of the zero-hour contract in the Spanish
legal system is also based on the existing limitations to
increases in working time beyond ordinary working time. In
this sense, article 35 of the Workers’ Statue limits overtime
to a maximum of 80 hours per year for indefinite full-time
workers. However, fixed-term full-time workers can do
overtime in this case, the maximum number of hours per
year of overtime is proportionate to the duration of the
contract.
In the Spanish legal system, part-time workers are not
entitled to overtime. Nevertheless, they are entitled to work,
what are called, additional hours. Article 12.5 of the Workers’
Statute allows part-time workers and employers to enter into
a specific agreement for the realization of working hours
above the ordinary working time. The number of additional
hours cannot exceed the limit of 30% of ordinary hours, or
60% if the collective agreement has increased the maximum
number of additional hours. The legislation, however, limits
the possibility of additional hours to part-time workers with
a minimum ordinary working time of 10 hours per week
on an annual basis. The agreement regarding additional
hours can be subscribed at the beginning or during the labor
relation but, in any case, it has to be a specific agreement
regarding additional hours and it has to be formalized in
writing. When an additional hours’ agreement exists, the
employer can demand that the worker provide his or her
services. However, the worker is entitled to a minimum
notice of three days of the date and time of working the
additional hours.
Furthermore, indefinite part-time workers with a minimum
ordinary working time of 10 hours a week on an annual basis
are also entitled, on top of the agreed additional hours, to
work voluntary additional hours. Voluntary additional hours
can be offered by the employer at any time and workers are
free to accept—that is, their denial cannot be considered
breach of contract. These voluntary additional hours can
be up to 15% of ordinary working time, extendable to 30%
by collective agreement.
It is true that the legal framework regarding part-time work
and, specifically, the regulation regarding additional hours
introduces a high level of working time flexibility which is
similar to the flexibility allowed by the zero-hour contract.
29
In
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
this sense, the regulation regarding additional hours in part-
time work allows ordinary hours to be exceeded by 45%, or
90% when extended by collective agreement. With respect
to indefinite part-time workers with an ordinary working
time of at least 10 hours per year on an annual basis, it is
possible to increase working hours up to 45% or, even, 90%.
As mentioned, this scheme,although not identical, is very
similar to the zero-hour contract, as it is possible to enter into
a contract with a very reduced number of ordinary hours—
zero in the case of the zero-hour contract and ten in the case
of part-time work in Spain—and increase working time with
additional hours to adjust the labor force to productive needs.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, despite the excessive flexibility
that arises from the Spanish part-time work regulation,
30
it cannot be fully identified with the zero-hour contract.
Contrary to the zero-hour contract, in part-time work
additional hours are limited (i) with respect to ordinary
hours, (ii) to workers with a minimum of 10 hours a week
on a yearly basis and (iii) cannot exceed the number of hours
performed by full-time workers in the company.
Other legal systems, nonetheless, permit the zero-hour
contract. For example, the United Kingdom allows for
zero-hour contracts;
31
that is, contracts in which there is no
certainty that work will be made available to the worker are
legal. However, according to article 53 of the Small Business,
Enterprise and Employment Act of 2015,
32
exclusivity clauses
among such contracts are considered null and void. Other
examples are Greece where, although there is no explicit
regulation, courts have accepted the zero-hour contract,
33
and Italy, which does not require contracts to specify working
time and allows employers to periodically fix working hours
depending on the company’s productive needs.
34
3.3. Does the illegality of the zero-hour contract
exclude the qualification of platform workers
as workers?
The zero-hour contract is, as analyzed in the previous
section, illegal in the Spanish legal system as the regulation
30. Sánchez Torres (2014).
31. Butler (2016, p. 73-74).
32. See
33. Angelopoulos and Boumpoucheropoulos (2016, p. 32-33).
34. Ferrante (2016, p. 42).
35. Agote (2017, p. 13-14).
obliges contracts to stipulate working time and because
there are limits to increases above ordinary working time.
Given the illegality of the zero-hour contract in the Spanish
legal system and since platform workers provide services,
de facto, in a zero-hour scheme, it is important to question
whether it is correct to qualify platform workers as workers. In
other words, it is important to question whether the illegality
of the zero-hour contract excludes the qualification of service
providers on online platforms as workers or employees.
In this sense, some authors have based their position on
the consideration of platform workers as self-employed
workers or independent contractors on the illegality of the
zero-hour contract in the Spanish legal system. According
to Agote “[t]he freedom to work when and if one wants,
radically eliminates the dependence requirement -inherent
in the employment relationship- from its premise: there is
no possibility in Spain of an employment relationship that
is activated or deactivated by the worker’s will”.
35
It is true that the Spanish regulation does not allow, not only
the zero-hour contract, but also an employment contract
where the worker unilaterally and freely determines his or
her own working time and willingness to work. As analyzed in
the first section of the paper, this is a defining characteristic
of self-employment that does not fit well with the traditional
definition of worker or employee.
Nevertheless, in my opinion, the adoption of a specific
business model cannot influence the classification of
service providers. That is, the use of a zero-hour contract
scheme by online platforms as a result of the phenomenon
of crowdsourcing and on-demand hiring, cannot affect
the qualification of service providers as workers. In other
words, the breach of working time regulation by platforms
cannot be used to their benefit to exclude an employment
relationship with service providers.
Especially because, as analyzed previously, the liberty that
platform workers have in determining their working hours
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
is in most cases not full and, even, apparent, the platform
exercises indirect forms of control over working hours by
recognizing economic incentives, predetermining slots
or time zones, establishing restrictions or limitations for
workers to change schedules, reserving the right to exclude
from the platform those service providers that do not log
on a minimum number of hours, etc.
Consequently, the zero-hour scheme used in platform
work, where workers are hired at the exact moment when
the demand or request for the service occurs and for the
specific duration of the provision of such service without
guaranteeing a minimum working time is illegal in the
Spanish legal system. Although it is acceptable in those
legal systems that allow the zero-hour contract, such as the
United Kingdom, Greece or Italy, as previously discussed, it
is not legal according to Spanish regulation.
4. To embrace or to preclude
the zero-hour contract: a question
about assuring the platform work
model or protecting workers’
interests
In this context, it is important to analyze, from a theoretical
perspective, whether jurisdictions should introduce and
regulate the zero-hour contract in platform work. That is,
if legal systems should embrace or preclude the zero-hour
scheme used by online platforms. In essence, the question
implies deciding whether legal systems should regulate this
type of contract to assure and allow the business model
used by digital platforms or if, on the contrary, jurisdictions
should ban the zero-hour contract with the aim of protecting
workers’ interests.
The platform work model based on hiring on-demand
has multiple business advantages that speak in favor of
regulating the zero-hour contract. The hiring on-demand
and the zero-hour schemes are more efficient in terms
of paring supply with demand and it allows companies to
perfectly adjust their workforce to the specific productive
need registered at any given time. As mentioned previously,
36. Srnicek (2017, p. 45).
new technologies the exact moment when the demand for a
service takes places to be identified and connect this service,
practically automatically, with a service provider. As a result,
it reduces transaction costs and it offers greater flexibility
in the management of working time, by eliminating inactive
or unproductive periods.
Note that the platform work model allows the company’s
workforce to be perfectly adapted to its productive needs
without incurring additional management costs related to
having to identify the optimal workforce needed at any given
time. By completely outsourcing the provision of the service,
the platform does not integrate the corresponding labor
costs and, therefore, has no incentive to minimize them in
order to maximize benefits. That is, platforms do not have
incentives to have an optimal number of service providers
available. On the contrary, they have incentives to attract
the maximum number of service providers to their platform
to ensure sufficient supply to respond to the demand at all
times. This phenomenon has been described by Srnicek as
the platform’s tendency to monopoly.
36
Nevertheless, as noted above, the platform work model based
on the zero-hour scheme entails significant social risks,
as it contributes to greater precarization of employment
relationships, even when platform workers are formally
considered workers or employees. By using a zero-hour
contract, not only is there a substitution of, more or less,
permanent or long-term relationships for very short-term
hiring, but workers are accessing lesser-quality employment
with no minimum guaranteed working time and, therefore,
no minimum wage guarantee.
According to Adams, Freedland and Prassl, the zero-hour
contract or, using the author’s terminology, no-minimum-
hours work arrangements are defined and characterized by
the extreme precariousness they generate, by attributing
to the worker all the risk associated with job insecurity and
remuneration. “[T]hese work arrangements are defined and
characterised by their extreme precariousness, that is to say
by the complete or almost complete precarity of the situation
of the workers who labor under these forms of engagement.
(…) these “no-minimum-hours work arrangements”
paradigmatically shift towards and locate upon the worker
the whole set of risks of insecurity of work and income which,
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
we argue, it has been one of the principal functions of labor
law to distribute equitably and manageably between workers
and employers”.
37
The zero-hour contract attributes excessive business
flexibility in managing working time that shifts greater risks
to workers. With this scheme of working time management,
platform workers assume the risks, costs—including
opportunity costs—of inactivity periods, lack of demand,
delays, malfunctioning of the app or software, etc., hence,
facing more penalties and job insecurity.
As a result, in my opinion zero-hour contracts should
be precluded in legal systems to guarantee and protect
workers’ interests and, in essence, because they further
allow the precarization of labor relations.
5. Part-time contracts in platform
work
Given the conclusion reached in the previous section
regarding the extreme precariousness derived from the
zero-hour contract o no-minimum-hours work arrangements,
my position is that legal systems should not adapt their
legislation to fit the work arrangements used by digital
platforms. The excessive instability and job insecurity
derived from no-minimum-hour work arrangements justifies
its exclusion from the Spanish legal-labor system as a way
to guarantee and protect workers’ rights.
In the debate regarding the need to adapt or review current labor
regulation to allow the platform work model based on hiring
on-demand, my opinion is contrary to a section of the literature,
which argues in favor of modifying regulations regarding
working time to include, within the employment contract,
workers’ flexibility in determining their own working time.
38
Nevertheless, the intent with this position is not to prohibit
platform work nor prevent technological innovations and
advancements. On the contrary, the idea is to identify
existing work arrangements that might suit the platform
37. Adams, Freedland and Prassl (2015, p. 19).
38. In this sense, see Todolí Signes (2017, p. 74).
39. Sánchez Torres (2014).
work model; in other words, channel platform work through
labor institutions already available in the legal system.
In this context, my opinion is that platform work in the
Spanish legal system could be performed through the part-
time contract. The Spanish regulation regarding part-time
work allows a high level of flexibility regarding management
of working time that, in my opinion, could fit with the
business model of digital platforms. As discussed above,
the part-time contract in the Spanish legal system allows for
the possibility of establishing a reduced number of ordinary
working hours (minimum ten hours a week on an annual
basis) and increasing working time through additional hours,
which can be up to 45%, or even 90%, of ordinary working
time when extended by collective agreement.
This type of contract offers a high level of flexibility regarding
working time which could fit well with the platform work
model. The legal regime regarding additional hours in part-
time work offers significant flexibility, as it allows workers
with low ordinary working hours to supplement their salary
by providing additional hours. It also allows companies
to hire workers for a reduced number of hours and then
increase them according to the company’s productive and
organizational needs.
The legal regime regarding part-time work in Spain has
been identified by a section of the literature as providing
excessive flexibility regarding working-time.
39
I Nevertheless,
I beelieve that the current regulation on part-time work
may fit well with the platform work model, as it entails the
flexibility that this model requires.
In addition, the legal regime regarding part-time contracts
in Spain is an improvement with respect to the zero-hour
contract, as it also offers some stability and legal certainty
to workers. As analyzed previously, additional hours can
only be developed by workers with a minimum working time
of ten hours per week on an annual basis. Furthermore,
workers who have an indefinite contract can only accept
voluntary additional hours. This regulation offers some
labor stability and certainty to workers, as they know
beforehand the minimum number of hours per week they
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
will provide services and, hence, the minimum amount of
remuneration they will receive. Additionally, only workers
with a stable relationship with the platform will be able to
access voluntary additional hours.
As a result, workers will not bear the entire risk of inactivity
periods, lack of demand, excessive competition in the
platform, malfunctioning of the platform etc., as they will
be guaranteed a minimum amount of remuneration for their
time.
Regarding the determination of working time.and, therefore,
compensation.it is important to note that the current
European regulation regarding working time requires
working time to be considered as the time during which
workers are logged on to the app and available to receive or
accept tasks or services. According to article 2.1 of Directive
2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of November 4, 2003 concerning certain aspects of the
organization of working time, working time is defined as
“any period during which the worker is working, at the
employer’s disposal and carrying out his activity or duties,
in accordance with national laws and/or practice”. The length
of time for which workers are connected to the App, not
only connected and locatable, but available to receive tasks
or services at any time and with the obligation to respond
to them immediately must be considered, according to the
EU Directive, as working time. And, as a result, this time
must be calculated as working time and, hence, it must be
time compensated. The former, however, without prejudice
to the fact that the platform may, in accordance with the
doctrine of the Court of Justice of the European Union,
40
establish a different remuneration figure for the period of
time where workers are connected to the app and awaiting
tasks or services and the period of time where workers are
effectively providing services.
The use of the part-time contract in platform work offers
platforms significant flexibility in the management and
organization of working time. It allows the essence of their
business model by which workers have a high degree of
freedom in determining their working time and volume of
work to be maintained without, however, shifting the entire
risk of inactivity or job insecurity to the workers.
40. Decision of the European Court of Justice (Third Chamber) of September 10, 2015 (c-266/14).
41. Prassl (2018, p. 133).
It is true, however, that the regulation of part-time
work–essentially, the limits on additional hours–and the
consideration of time workers are connected to the
App and available as working time increase the costs of
management and organization of work. It is true, that the
zero-hour contract might be more beneficial for platforms,
as it does not subject them to a minimum ordinary working
time, limited additional hours, or management costs in terms
of determining the optimal level of workers connected to
the app at a given time. However, the excessive flexibility
and labor instability that no-minimum-hour arrangements
entail requires that platform work be channeled through
an alternative labor contract or regulatory regime that
offers flexibility in the management of working time and
still guarantees some degree of labor stability and quality
of work.
As argued by Prassl, “[e]nsuring the full application of
employment law is crucial if we want to make the gig economy
work for all. (…) For the industry to operate to everyone’s
benefit, however, we need to ensure that platforms can no
longer arbitrage around existing rules and have to bear
the cost of their operations. Employment law in the key to
equitable conditions for all workers, and equal competition
amongst businesses new and old”.
41
6. Final remarks
Online platforms like Uber, Lift, Taskrabbit, Deliveroo, Glovo
or Amazon Mechanical Turk have significantly altered the
form of work. The platform work model is based on the
provision of services exclusively outsourced to a wide
number of formally considered self-employed workers or
independent contractors that are hired on-demand for the
provision of a specific task or service.
This model, however, entails significant social risks, as
it contributes to the precarization -or, in this context,
“uberization”- of labor relations as a result of the
substitution of employment relationships for independent
contractors, the shift from permanent or, more or less,
long-term relations to very short-term hiring, the increase
in job insecurity as a result of the zero-hour scheme, the
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The zero-hour contract in platform work…
reduction in wages due to the remuneration by gig and
the atomization of labor relations which reduces workers’
effective collective rights.
From a labor law standpoint, however, the first argument
regarding the platform work model is whether there is a
misclassification of service providers on online platforms.
In this debate, my opinion—coincident with the majority of
judicial and administrative decisions that have analyzed
this matter—is that platform work must be categorized as
dependent and subordinate work and, hence, is the object of
an employment relationship. Because of the indirect forms
of management and control used by the platform and the
lack of a true business organization by service providers,
there is a misclassification of workers as self-employed
workers or independent contractors.
The second argument is related to the zero-hour scheme
used in platform work. As analyzed in this paper, online
platforms acting in the gig-economy use, de facto, the zero-
hour contract as workers are hired when there is a demand
for a task or service and for the exact duration of the task
or service. The zero-hour contract allows platforms to
perfectly adjust the workforce to productive needs. However,
it contributes to the precarization of work as it is a working
time arrangement that does not guarantee a minimum
working time and, as a result, a minimum compensation,
shifting all risk of job insecurity to workers. In summary, in
my opinion zero-hour contracts should be precluded in legal
systems in terms of guaranteeing and protecting workers’
interests.
Platform work should be carried out through an employment
contract and in fair working conditions in terms of working
time and salary. Platform workers should have a recognized
minimum and maximum working time. Despite allowing for
a working time scheme that attributes greater flexibility to
workers to determine the distribution of their working time,
platform workers should be guaranteed a minimum and
maximum working time with a corresponding guaranteed
salary. In the Spanish legal system, part-time contracts
with the possibility of working additional hours results as
the appropriate contract for platform work, as it allows an
important working time flexibility in management and the
organization of working time, without shifting the entire
risk of inactivity or job insecurity to workers.
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Recommended citation
GINÈS FABRELLAS, Anna (2019). “The zero-hour contract in platform work. Should we ban it or embrace
it?”. IDP. Revista de Internet, Derecho y Política. No. 28, pp. 29-43. UOC [Accessed: dd/mm/yy]
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About the author
Anna Ginès Fabrellas
anna.gines@esade.edu
Associate Professor, Department of Law in ESADE
Contracted Doctoral Professor URL
Universitat Ramon Llull, ESADE Law School
http://www.esade.edu/faculty/anna.gines
Avenida Pedralbes, 60-62
08034 Barcelona
Spain
