Los debates lingüísticos sobre la integración de los inmigrantes en Francia: ¿integración inmigratoria o control inmigratorio?

Immigrant integration has become one of the most recurrent debates in contemporary France, which has witnessed a remarkable number of intellectual relections, political and media debates over the past few years. Integration is depicted as one of the country’s greatest challenges and political leaders of all sides recurrently call for the reformulation of the politics of integration, placing it at the top of the political agenda.

In these debates, language has occupied a prominent position. Depicted in political discourses as necessary, often under the rhetorical umbrella of a new "civic integration agenda", the past few years have witnessed an explosion of measures aimed at making language compulsory to enter, reside, reunite or naturalize. An increasing number of scholars (Joppke 2007, Guiraudon 2008, Carrera 2009; Hogan-Brun et al. 2009, Kostakopolou 2010, Van Oers 2013, Azoulai & de Vries 2014) have pointed out the instrumentalization of language as a gate-keeping mechanism for immigrant control, being transformed into a regulatory technique for the state (Carrera & Atger 2011).

This paper traces the discursive evolution of the progressive instrumentalization of language for immigrant control, analyzing the ideological underpinnings and the rhetorical devices that have served to legitimize this exclusionary role. I will analyze how the alleged lack of language skills among the immigrant population has been artiicially constructed by a particular party in power - the centre-right UMP -, and framed as an threat to the values of la République using the rhetoric inherent to the extreme-right wing Front National (FN). The analysis will show how this exclusionary approach has progressively become the current public philosophy on immigrant integration and how the attempts by the current party in government, the Socialist party, to break this dominant ideology have failed, bringing to the surface the deep ideological cleavage on immigration in France.

Theoretical framework, corpus and methodology

The analysis has been carried out through Thompson’s Depth Hermeneutics, developed in Discourse Analysis, which allows us to provide a thorough analysis in three stages:

1) the socio-political analysis, which looks at the historical, political and social context in which debates are produced 2) the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used as legitimating strategies and 3) the interpretative phase, which is closely intertwined with the previous two.

As for the selection of empirical material, the corpus used for the analysis consists of six different sources:

1) Using the specialized search engine Factiva, I have gathered 364 newspaper articles and debates in French media dealing speciically with language and immigration over the period 2005-2014.

2) 44 oficial government speeches on immigration, integration and language by French Ministers and Prime Ministers.

3) 20 policy measures on language for immigrant integration.

4) 12 oficial reports and recommendations linking language to immigrant integration policies, mainly from the governmental advisory body Haute Conseil de l’Intégration (HCI).

5) 10 Government Annual Reports to the Parliament containing the strategic goals on immigration.

6) Five semi-structured interviews with senior government oficials and minister advisors from three departments, the Department of the Interior, the Cabinet of Manuel Valls, former Minister of the Interior, and the Language Policy Department of the French Government.

The analysis of such a considerable wealth of information has been facilitated by the use of the software programme Atlas.ti, which has allowed me to code, categorize and systematize the recurrent references on language on immigrant integration debates in my corpus. The analysis has allowed me to interpret how, inserted in material practices of modulation and reproduction over time, the language debates on immigrant

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integration in France have shaped a dominant ideology of immigrant control. Figure 1 below provides a succinct account.

Figure 1. Corpus and methodology

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The period chosen for the analysis - 2005 to May 2014 - is not ascribed to chance: 2005 witnessed an outbreak of public relection on the failure of immigrant integration due to the unprecedented violent riots across France. Along this period, lack of language skills has often been blamed as one of the reasons for integration failure. Not all political parties, however, have adopted the same rhetoric. Given that the period chosen has seen a party alternation in power - UMP and Socialists - the analysis will also serve to bring to the surface the ideological variation on the topic.

The paper is divided into three sections. Following Thompson’s framework, section one analyzes how the social and political conditions under which debates on language for immigrant integration are produced; section two provides an in-depth analysis of the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used to legitimate language measures. Finally, section three highlights the main conclusions derived from the empirical analysis.

The results are expected to provide a thorough account on how, followed through in a determined way and shaped relentlessly over time, France has adopted an exclusionary approach on immigrant integration through the problematization of language, turning it into a gate-keeping mechanism for immigration control, transforming it into the dominant ideology and making it part and parcel of the current French public philosophy on immigrant integration.

The role language occupies in French politics on immigrant integration today cannot be fully understood without a succinct account of the political, economic and social context of the late 80’s. In his masterfully written account of France’s philosophy of integration, Favell (1998) attributes the passage from an unproblematized, pragmatic approach to immigrant integration to a discourse involving grand concepts of la République, identity and values to two speciic moments in the early 90’s: the creation of the Commission de la Nationalité (1990-93) - established after an all-party recognition of the need to relect on the new social, cultural and economic order of the 80’s - and the setting up of the Haut Conseil de l’Intégration (HCI) in 1989, the oficial advisory body on integration issues.

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According to Favell, this frame was created to build an interpretative scheme locating immigrant integration policies as the "natural" product of French particularisms. The French public philosophy on immigrant integration was depicted as if it had always been dealt with within the same parameters of the ideas of Republicanism and citizenship, a theory " at pains to mask the recentness and artiiciality of its construction and the incompleteness of the question it focuses on" (Favell 2001: 43).

Discourses were remarkably different before the 90’s, where there was no automatic link between integration and the grand ideas of Republican citizenship or national identity and where debates revolved more around socio-economic issues. Favell attributes this passage from a pragmatic, socio-economic approach to a symbolic, highly ideological strategy to three different political events taking place during the mid-80’s which laid the foundations of current discourses on immigrant integration: a) the growing power of regionalism, b) the decline of the nation as a source of social solidarity and c) France’s growing engagement in the European Union, perceived as a threat to centralized France.

All these issues would not have been problematized and framed in terms of grand symbolism - Favell argues - had not been for the emergence of the Front National, the party that adopted a well-prepared rhetorical line on blaming immigrants for the political and economic malaise of the country, exacerbating fundamental questions on national identity, a line politically attractive enough which would be progressively coniscated by the UMP to attract the far-right votes, as we shall see in the empirical analysis below.

This is how the reconceptualization of the French community took shape. With the aid of periodic reports by the HCI and the support of en-vogue intellectuals disseminating the new terms of the debate in the media, the new philosophy of integration rapidly gained ground. The new framework was mainstreamed, gaining pre-eminence in public debates on immigrant integration. As we shall see below, language was soon placed at the service of this new strategy.

The corpus compiled has allowed me to trace the discursive evolution of how the exclusionary approach on language has progressively taken shape as well as to identify the rhetorical devices and chains of reasoning used as a legitimating strategy. Figure 5 below illustrates graphically this evolution, and contains information on three speciic aspects: 1) the intensity of the debates, measured through the number of references appearing in media, oficial speeches and reports, showcased along the Y axis; 2) the tangible materialization of discourses: the 20 concrete language measures (numbers 1 to 20) further explained in igure 2 above, and 3) the dominant topic thrown at speciic periods, highlighted in different colors in the graph, which provides a bird’s-eye view of how the different discursive elements that have shaped the dominant discourse at speciic moments. The graph also highlights the speciic electoral periods in 2007 and 2012 so as to better illustrate the instrumentalization of language in (pre) election campaigns.

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Figure 5. Discursive evolution of language in French politics on immigration

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Source: own elaboration

The dynamic, luctuating evolution of language debates, modulated and reproduced over time, has allowed me to identify the ive main narrative features that have been recurrently used in the dominant discourse to legitimize the instrumentalization of language for immigrant control:

2.1 The recurring idea of integration failure to legitimate language measures

2.2 Contre l’immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie. [Against suffered migration. Chosen migration] The invented motto to instrumentalize language for immigrant control.

2.3Communautarisme: Blaming immigrants’ lack of language skills for their isolationism in French society

2.4 Linking lack of language skills to a threat to national identity

2.5 The European Union rhetoric as a legitimating resource

2.1 The recurring idea of integration failure as a justiication to legitimate language measures

"French people know that the violent riots in our banlieues last fall [referring to 2005] are linked to the failure of our immigrant integration policy... Allowing a large number of immigrants to enter France without giving them the necessary means leads to explosive situations. How can we expect them to integrate if they do not speak a word of French".¹⁶, stated Minister of the Interior Sarkozy to legitimate the irst law making language compulsory for residence (item 2 in igure 5 above).

What began to crystallize was not so much the idea of failure itself - an argument often used in French discourses on integration¹⁷, but linking failure to the lack language skills. Invoked for the irst time to legitimize the 2006 Law making language compulsory, the notion would be constantly invoked to justify further measures on language in all stages of the immigration process.

Of particular relevance is the high number of references in press, oficial speeches and reports linking language to family reuniication, depicted as necessary to avoid integration failure (see measure 3 in igure 5 above): "The French integration system has failed...We must give a response to the French people, who are asking us to manage migration lows to preserve the balance of our national community....Language

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is the best tool for integration...Immigrants must not wait until they arrive in France to learn the French language".¹⁸

Thrown in the months prior to the 2007 electoral campaign, the number of references on language skyrocketed, as shown in igure 5 above. Along with the idea of failure, discourses revolved around mass migration pouring into France, immigrants being poorly qualiied and unable to speak French, as stated by the then Immigration Minister Sarkozy: "Against any logic, we have accepted an increasing number of immigrants for family reuniication purposes, which heavily unbalances our labor market, allowing foreigners in our country who are for the most part little qualiied and poorly integrated...I want those immigrants applying for family reuniication to take a language test in our consulates to prove proper knowledge of French" ¹⁹. The law was justiied as necessary by UMP spokesperson, Y. Hugo, as "I witness on a daily basis the tragedies of hundreds of families in which one of the parents does not speak or practice French."²⁰, an argument hard to sustain empirically as shown in igure 4 above.

The idea of failure was discursively symbolized in the high unemployment rates among immigrants, attributed to their low level of French. This reasoning was used to justify the compulsory nature of measures and the raising of language standards, as succinctly summarized in the Minister’s 2009 speech on new immigrant integration guidelines:

"The language level required in France is relatively low and this undoubtedly constitutes a real handicap to access the job market. This largely explains the fact that 93% of women who have applied for family reuniication do not have any activity in France. This situation is unacceptable. I have asked the Directorate for Immigrant integration and Citizenship to consider raising the language level in all four phases of the so-called parcours d’intégration "integration path": in the countries of origin, within the framework of the CAI, to obtain the residence permit and in the naturalization process"²¹.

Other than from an ideological standpoint, these tenets are hardly justiiable empirically. If language is compulsory for family reuniication, residence and nationality - often becoming a triple hurdle - if language standards are raised and if more than 75% of immigrants applying for residence permits do not need any language provision, as shown in igure 3, one wonders how the high unemployment rates among immigrant population can be attributed to lack of language skills.

Resorting to failure was to take a U-turn in 2012 with the new Socialist government in power. Rather than attributing it to the lack of language skills, the the 2013 Tuot report revisiting France’s integration policies (item 19 in igure 5) openly admitted failure but not due to lack of language skills by immigrants, but rather because of the erroneous attribution of failure to language, a non-existing problem: "Reducing integration to language has been one of our problems, both intellectual and operational, of the past politics of integration".²²The report overtly admitted that "language is not a problem. Even in the best years, it only concerned less than one third of the immigrant population".²³Despite these recommendations, however, the Socialist government has maintained the compulsory nature of language tests.

2.2 Contre l’immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie. The invented motto to instrumentalize language for immigrant control

"Contre l’immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie... France must be able to choose the number of immigrants it hosts, according to its objectives and conditions... Immigration choisie means, above all, the possibility to set the quantiiable objectives, and to determine the composition of migration lows in the best interest of France".²⁴

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The idea of selecting only immigrants that serve the interest of France was an overt objective of the UMP government from the very outset, discursively crystallized through the invention of the motto Contre l’immigration subie, pour une immigration choisie. Recurrently repeated to justify legislative measures adopted, this utilitarian approach was found not only in government speeches but also in countless reports, commissioned by the government itself to "profoundly revisit the French immigration policy to better manage migration lows and favor une immigration choisie"²⁵, which left no doubt on the ideological path France had initiated: "a more eficient selection system distinguishing immigrants who are more determined to integrate in France must be put in place"²⁶, proposed the inluential Milhaud report.

If immigrant selection was the goal, language was the instrument: "we must select future newcomers, better prepared for integration and fewer in number, through language tests"²⁷, concluded the report. The oficial reaction to these recommendations was a clear declaration of intentions of what was to follow: "This report represents a decisive point in our immigration policy. Its application shall be one of the State grand priorities of this government in the ield of integration."²⁸The instrumentalization of language to select immigrants was to be the main rationale in France’s integration policies over the period 2005-2012, becoming the dominant discourse through the persistent use of the motto. The new aspect in this discursive line was not so much the utilitarian approach to language, often used in immigration strategies of many states (see Van Oers 2013, Kostakopoulou 2010, among others) but the fact that reducing the number of immigrants through language measures was an explicit objective.

The idea of selecting migration was met with ierce opposition not only by the left-wing political spectrum, immigrant associations and NGOs²⁹alike but also by the Catholic Church. During the months prior to its approval in 2006, the Church expressed high concerns on the law, labeling it as utilitarian, arguing that "the law considers immigrants as mere laborers and not human beings"³⁰. The intensity of the debates - illustrated in igure 5 by the high number of references around this measure (item 2) - forced the Minister of the Interior to state that "the Church is in its role to insist on the need to respect the dignity of people. I have therefore accepted to amend the draft bill and incorporate certain remarks"³¹. This modiication did not include, however, any modiication on language, which remained compulsory.

The constant invocation of the motto was to serve to legitimate further measures: "Our irst goal is to manage immigration quantitatively. New instruments will allow us to better regulate migration lows. From now on, the Government will deine each year in a report to Parliament the number of immigrants France wishes to host"³². If bringing numbers down was the goal, language was, again, one of the main instruments: "our ultimate goal being to better manage family reuniication lows, you have now two new tools at your disposal: DNA tests and language tests"³³instructed Minister for Immigration B. Hortefeux to all ambassadors of France when presenting the 2007 family reuniication law, a measure that sparked high controversy and contestation due to its discriminatory, utilitarian nature.

Invented to legitimize the 2006 law on residence and used exponentially to justify the 2007 law on reuniication, the motto would also be the narrative feature used to justify the measures raising the language standards (items 9, 10, 11 and 12 in igure 5): "We need to continue to better control access to French nationality...The level of French language required to access nationality has been raised because naturalization consecrates, for those who wish so, the end of the integration and assimilation process into our society".³⁴

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It did not take long to achieve the expected results: family reuniication permits went down by more than 35% (as shown in igure 6 below), and the same trend followed by work permits, down by 26%, and nationality permits, down by 30% in 2012³⁵.

Figure 6. Evolution of family reuniication permits (2005-2011)

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Source: French Ministry of the Interior (2012)

This utilitarian line intensiied during the 2012 election campaign, used indistinctively by the UMP and the Front National: "the idea is to go down to the immigration igures of the 90’s" stated Immigration Minister C. Guéant, an idea also highlighted by Prime Minister Sarkozy when he stated that "we must reduce the number of immigrants by half"³⁶in which reference to the idea of "suficient knowledge of French" was recurrently invoked, the same rhetoric used by the Front National in their campaign³⁷.

Opposing this utilitarian approach, the new Socialist government withdrew the 31 May 2011 Circular limiting work permits³⁸to foreign students (item 10) and eased the conditions to grant nationality (item 19), but maintained, however, the compulsory nature of language tests.

2.3 Communautarisme: Blaming immigrants’ lack of language skills for their isolationism in French society

French rhetoric has often used the term communautarisme, a French concept, roughly translated as isolationism, coined in the mid 90’s by the Front National to portray immigrants’ unwillingness to assimilate. This term insuflates a certain ethno-nationalist ideology aimed at sustaining the nation-state and serves to introduce any issue in public national debates on immigration under the threat of having the enemy inside (Dhume 2010: 1), an idea fully captured by the discourse of the Minister of the Interior: "Immigrant communities organize themselves against l’intégration Républicaine to engage in endogamic practices".³⁹

Portraying immigrants as the enemy inside and agitating the fear thorough the idea of communautarisme was to become a recurrent narrative device in immigrant integration debates. The idea was simple: language must be compulsory to prevent immigrants from remaining isolated from la République, as shown in the speech by Immigration Minister to justify the 2007 family reuniication law: "If we want to prevent immigrants from remaining isolated in their communities and in their languages of origin, we must give them the possibility to learn French when they decide to immigrate to France...Imposing a language test on family reuniication candidates will help us ight communautarisme and compensate those immigrants willing to make an effort to really integrate. Those refusing to take the test or refusing to follow the training language courses will not enter France"⁴⁰Language was depicted as necessary to "facilitate contact and access to an active life, rather than to remain isolated in their communities"⁴¹and measures were justiied because of the "high concerns raised by the resurgence of certain communautarismes"⁴², as it was claimed to legitimate the need for a national identity debate in 2009, causing a public stir as shown in the high number of references around these debates (item 9 in igure 5 above). "The government wants a society in which there is no communautarisme. Immigrants in our country must adopt customs and respect our laws. When immigrants do not regularly attend our

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language and integration programmes, our legislation foresees sanctions"⁴³was the discursive line used in the 2012 election campaign. Invoking constant fear was an extremely useful rhetorical device to legitimate the language measures.

In the legitimating process, the government also resorted to the rhetoric of the HCI to further legislate its actions making reference to communautarisme. In the 2010 report The Challenges of Integration in Education (2010) on integration and schooling, the HCI proposed the suppression of mother-tongue instruction (ELCO), as it considered to have negative consequences for children⁴⁴, concluding that "by promoting mother tongues, students risk becoming detached from the Republican values while the mission of schooling is to bring them closer to them. ELCO can lead to communautarisme... The HCI proposes the elimination of the teaching of languages and cultures of origin as they seem to go against the objective of integration⁴⁵.

The attempts by the new Socialist government - through the expert reports published in November 2013 - to break this dominant language ideology, not only by omitting reference to communautarisme but also recognizing France’s linguistic diversity, sparked a heated reaction (measure 20). The new government was accused by the UMP and the Front National alike of attempting to dismantle la République. "This report breaks the Republican assimilation model and considers communautarisme as the new French model. I cannot accept that our language, French, be put at the same level as the rest of the languages"⁴⁶stated UMP spokesperson A. Jupé, the same discursive reaction as the Front National leader Marine Le Pen, who claimed that "this will mean the end of the Republican model and the putting in place of an ultra-communautarized society".⁴⁷Representing an abrupt rupture of the dominant ideology, the ideas proposed in the reports caused such a stir in French politics - as perceived in the high number of references around the publication of the report (item 20 in igure 5) that the French President, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Immigration had to come up front stage to clarify the Government’s oficial position: "this is not the oficial Government position"⁴⁸ unanimously claimed the three members of government. The attempts to break the dominant discourse and introduce new elements such as the idea of multiple languages and identities had utterly failed.

The analysis of the language debates on immigrant integration in France has shown the mutation of language as a tool aimed at procuring conformity and immigration control, creating a linkage between these previously separate domains. I have traced the evolution of how language has been discursively problematized by a particular political party in power, the UMP, by adopting the discourse of the Front National, and how the opposition parties, mainly the Socialist Party, have been unable to break the dominant discourse.

Through this analysis, the article has shown how the notion of integration has been gradually transformed into a regulatory technique of immigration control managed by the state. The conditionality subsumed in this new version of integration paradoxically demands that foreigners demonstrate knowledge on the way of life, values, culture, history and language of the receiving state as a sine qua non condition for integration (Carrera & Atger 2011). The new approach imposes the heaviest burden of proof on immigrants’ shoulders to demonstrate their integration into a homogeneous framing which ideally exists at the foundation of the nation: la République.

The mandatory nature of language for integration implies that immigrants’ failure to comply with this obligation justiies the application of sanctions by the state - which range from denying access to the country to the non-granting of a visa/residence permit or non-renewal of the latter, falling into irregularity and/or the consequent expulsion from its territory. Language, in this case, far from being an instrument for integration, becomes an effective tool for immigrant control.

The combination of legislation along with formalized institutional structures -the HCI being the most remarkable one - on the one hand, and a constant invocation of idiosyncratic national myths, rituals and conventions, on the other, have built up the current French public philosophy on immigrant integration in which language has strategically occupied a central role. The analysis has shown that it is not only the formal content of the public policy that counts but also the grand symbolism and the discursive packaging around the role of language, sustained through the rhetorical devices of logos - the innocuous-looking motto "Contre l’immigration subie. Pour une immigration choisie" - pathos - appealing to the people’s fears

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through the idea of communautarisme - and ethos -invoking French national identity - along with the constant invocation to failure to legitimize stricter policies on language .

The highbrow Republican rhetoric and the grand symbolism of the debates have shown a remarkable gap between discourses and the empirical data. While the lack of language skills among immigrants is discursively depicted as one of France’s greatest integration problems, actual igures are far from this rhetorical line. The empirical analysis has shown that immigrant entries into the country have remained somewhat constant. Similarly, the data on language needs indicate that more than 75% of immigrants wishing to reside in France already have suficient knowledge of French.

Far from being a covert strategy, the ideological shift towards the instrumentalization of language for immigration control has been an explicit, systematic policy, producing the expected results: a remarkable reduction in permits for residence, family reuniication or nationality.

The recent attempts by the Socialists, in power since 2012, to shape a new rhetoric by breaking the terms of the debate - dropping the over-encouragement of grand symbolism, recognizing the multiple identities, cultures, religions and languages in France - have met with the frontal opposition of the right and the far right, considering it an offence to the sacrosanct République française.

The blunt opposition has not only brought to the surface the deep ideological cleavage over the terms of the debate between the UMP-Front National, on the one side, and the Socialists, and other more left-wing parties, associations and NGOs on the other. It also showed the impossibility of breaking a well-forged exclusionary dominant ideology on language, constantly followed through in a determined way, shaped relentlessly over time and skillfully transformed into a public philosophy.

During its time in government, the UMP imposed a language, epistemology and scheme on the role of language for immigrant integration, tenaciously sustained over time, become the current dominant ideology on language, discursively legitimated and justiied after being previously problematized artiicially. As pointed out by Favell "once established, the political forces that are invested in the current status quo by the political parties that have thrown it centre-stage need to continually reafirm and reproduce the policy framework. Against this background, adaptation is problematic because it cannot bring into question the overall framework without risking a renewed crisis" (Favell 2001: 29) as the one sparked by the recent attempts by the Socialist government to de-problematize language.

Despite the deep party cleavage, this article has also shown the existence of an element that is persistently present across the political spectrum: the idea of le parcours d’intégration. Integration is depicted as a process, a path, a journey - le parcours - that immigrants must go through. In this parcours, knowledge of language, along values and identity play a pivotal role. Language alone, however, is not enough for full integration. Discourses and legislation alike focus on the concept of nationality -often used interchangeably with the concept of citizenship - as the inal stage in the parcours. The end of the journey, the inishing line in the integration process is to become "a French citizen", that is, to obtain French nationality.

De l’immigré au citoyen [From immigrant to citizen]. This formula, coined by HCI advisor J. Costa-Lascoux, succinctly illustrates France’s approach on immigrant integration, regarded as a process with different steps along the way; a political formula that places all the weight at the "end" of the integration process, le citoyen, who must comply with all the norms of la République to become part of the polity. Language is a core element, but citizenship is only achieved through nationality. In other words, for full integration, emphasis is placed mainly on the concept of citizenship as a legal status (nationality), and not so much on the concept of citizenship as political activity (participation) and citizenship as identity (loyalty to the country). Debates often link language to participation and identity but it is only when discussing the language-nationality binomial that the concept of citizenship appears. The analysis has therefore shown that the political consensus reached over the French Republican public philosophy in the late 80’s based on the concept of citizenship - with a strong connection with the formal status of membership in the nation, spelled out in nationality law - remains as valid today as in the past.

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Rather than addressing the real causes of integration failure - notably poverty, inequality and a declining welfare state - the French philosophy on immigrant integration continues to be dominated by grand, highly symbolic notions and endless terminological discussions on France’s philosophical peculiarities that in the current dynamics of increasing complexity, diversity and rapid social change, fail to provide effective policy responses. French politics on immigration: plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.

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[1] Statement by J. Chirac, 26 June 2006

[2] Statement by N. Sarkozy, 06 June 2006

[3] Le Nouvel Observateur. Sarkozy : J’irai chercher les électeurs du FN, 29 June 2006

[4] L’Humanité, 08 October 2007

[5] Data provided by Immigration senior oficials in the French Administration. See also Adami (2008)

[6] Le Monde. Quelle France pour demain ? 31 May 2011

[7] See C. Daadouch (2013)

[8] Press release by French Universities: FLIC? Le français, langue d’une intégration controlée. 09 November 2011

[9] See the proposals by all the political parties: France/présidentielle: grandes propositions des candidats en matière d’immigration, 22 April 2012

[10] See Circulaire NOR INTK1229185C, 28 November 12

[11] See Press release of 31 May 12

[12] La Grande nation. Pour une société inclusive, p.12

[13] Report Connaissance - Reconnaissance, November 2013 p.4

[14] UMP Press release , 17 December 2013. http://www.u-m-p.org/actualites/argumentaires-infographies/argumentaire-integration-la-gauche-ouvre-la-porte-au-102861812

[15] See 2014 electoral program http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/

[16] Speech by N. Sarkozy 02 May 2006

[17] See the epic discourse of French Prime Minister on the Constitutional reform due to immigrant integration failure on 14 October 2002. Available at http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/027000276.html

[18] Speech by Minister for Immigration, C. Guéant, 18 September 2007

[19] Speech by Minister for Integration and subsequent Prime Minister, N. Sarkozy, 05 March 2007

[20] Agence France Presse, 04 July 2007

[21] Speech by Immigration Minister E. Besson, 21 January 2009

[22] La Grande Nation. Pour une société inclusive, 2013 p. 50

[23] Op.cit.

[24] Speech by N. Sarkozy, 02 May 2006

[25] Government Mission Letter to expert C. Milhaud, 15 December 2005

[26] The Milhaud report. L’intégration économique des immigrants, September 2006 p.12

[27] Op.cit.

[28] Speech by Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy 05 October 2006

[29] AFP. L’Assemblée rend obligatoire le contrat d’accueil et d’intégration, 04 May 2006

[30] Sud-Oest. Les Églises s’inquiètent, 25 April 2006

[31] Speech by Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy, 02 May 2006

[32] Speech by Immigration Minister N. Sarkozy, 06 June 2006

[33] Speech by Immigration Minister B. Hortefeux, 28 August 2008

[34] Speech by Immigration Minister C. Guéant, 03 March 2012

[35] Le Jeudi ,10 January 2012

[36] Le Point, 6 March 2012

[37] Available at http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/

[38] Government Press Release, 31 May 2012

[39] Cited in Lochak (2006)

[40] Speech by Minister for Immigration, C. Guéant, 18 September 2007

[41] Le Figaro. Le français obligatoire pour les candidats à l’immigration, 30 October 2008

[42] Circulaire of 2 November 2009 NOR : IMIK0900089C

[43] Le Parisien. Guéant prône l’assimilation, 18 November 2011

[44] HCI, Les déis de l’intégration, 2010, p.27

[45] HCI, op.cit., pp.29-30

[46] UMP Press release, 13 December 2013

[47] Libération, Vives réactions après l’exhumation d’un rapport sur l’intégration, 13 December 2013

[48] Le Parisien, Intégration : «Pas du tout la position du gouvernement», tranche Hollande, 13 December 2013

[49] Le Figaro. Identité nationale : Sarkozy persiste et signe, 14 March 2007

[50] Cited by L. Joffrin (2007)

[51] Le Figaro, Seriez-vous choqué par la création d’un ministère de l’Immigration et de l’Identité nationale?, 16 March 2007

[52] L’Humanité, Nouvelle provocation de Nicolas Sarkozy, 19 March 2007

[53] News Press, Pourquoi un ministère de l’Immigration, 04 June 2007

[54] L’Humanité : Un « détail » lourd de symboles, 08 October 2007

[55] See Circulaire of November 2009 Ref: IMIK0900089C

[56] L’Express. Fillon enterre l’identité nationale avec des mesurettes, 08 February 2010

[57] Of special relevance is the press release published by the Socialist Party denouncing the instrumentalization of national identity for electoral reasons on 03 November 2009

[58] See C. Jeannot et al. (2011)

[59] Bulletin Quotidien Un séminaire gouvernemental autour du Premier ministre François FILLON pour un «point d’étape» dans le débat sur l’identité nationale, 08 February 2010

[60] La Croix. Vu de France, Le gouvernement cherche une porte de sortie, 08 February 2010

[61] Interview to Immigration Minister M. Éric Besson, 08 February 2008

[62] Associated Press. Débat sur l’identité nationale: Fillon tente de prendre de la hauteur. 08 February 2010.

[63] Tuot report. Une grande nation. Pout une société inclusive, February 2013, p.10

[64] See http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-de-letat/immigration/

[65] Speech by N. Sarkozy, 02 May 2006

[66] Report Politiques d’intégrations des migrants dans l’Union européenne December 2006

[67] See the report Analyse comparative de différents modèles d’intégration en Europe: HCI, December 2006

[68] L’intégration économique des migrants, 2006, p.12

[69] Le Figaro Immigration : le candidat de l’UMP hausse le ton, 06 March 2007

[70] Speech by Minister Hortefeux, 28 January 2008

[71] AFP. Immigration : le contrat d’intégration, un «tout petit détail, 05 June 2008

[72] Communication from the European Commission, COM (2008) 610 inal, p.7

[73] Council Conclusions on Integration Policies in the European Union, 5 November 2008